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STATEMENT OP JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 35-1-86. 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Was the Industrial Commission correct in relying on the 
lent-employee doctrine in resolving this matter, when the 
Respondent Mark Bundy submitted arguments on each element of that 
doctrine in his motion for review, and when the Industrial 
Commission is authorized to review and decide its cases without 
deference to the decision of the Administrative Law Judge. 
2. Did the Industrial Commission correctly apply the lent-
employee doctrine in finding that, because the decedent was 
performing the work of Petitioner BB&B Trucking, and was subject 
to its direction and control, BB&B Trucking was the sole employer 
of decedent and therefore solely liable for workers compensation 
death benefits. 
The standard of review for both issues is correction of 
error. Uintah Oil Assoc, v. County Bd. of Equalization. 853 P.2d 
894, 896 (Utah 1993). 
As to the issue or issues regarding Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-107 and the Uninsured Employers Fund, Mr. Bundy 
incorporates by reference those portions of the Uninsured 
Employers Fund's brief, which deal with the appropriate 
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interpretation of that statute and are not inconsistent with this 
brief. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutes are referred to herein. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-42 (Complete text is located at 
addendum 4 attached hereto). 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-86: 
The Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction to review, reverse, or 
annul any order of the commission, 
or to suspend or delay the 
operation or execution of any 
order. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12 (Complete text is located at 
addendum 5 attached hereto.) 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-107 (Complete text is located at 
addendum 6 attached hereto.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case. 
This is a petition for review of an order of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah. The Industrial Commission awarded 
death benefits to the minor heirs of Robert T. Phillipson. Mr. 
Phillipson was killed as the result of an accident arising out of 
and in the course of his employment. (R. 224-235, Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, attached hereto as Addendum 
1; R. 275-281, Order Granting Motion for Review, attached hereto 
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as Addendum 2.) The award of benefits is not contested in the 
petition for review. However, Petitioners BB&B Transportation 
("BB&B") and Workers Compensation Fund of Utah ("WCFU") complain 
that they should not be held liable for the full benefit amount. 
The minor heirs to Mr. Phillipson are not parties to the petition 
for review. 
2. Course of Proceedings. 
Mr. Phillipson was injured on May 10, 1991 in a motor 
vehicle accident. The injuries resulted in his death. At the 
time of the accident Mr. Phillipson was driving a truck owned by 
Respondent Mark Bundy and leased to petitioner BB&B. The spouse 
and minor heirs of Mr. Phillipson filed a claim for death 
benefits on August 3, 1992. (R.4). The spouse's claim was 
dismissed because it had been filed beyond the one year statute 
of limitation period. However, the administrative law judge 
ruled that the statute of limitations was tolled as to the minor 
heirs. (R.47). That ruling is not contested by the parties. 
A formal adjudicative hearing was held April 22, 1993. The 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order were entered 
May 6, 1993. (R. 244-235; Addendum 2 attached hereto.) The 
administrative law judge held that Mr. Phillipson was an employee 
of both BB&B and Mr. Bundy at the time of his death, and that 
therefore both employers were jointly and severally liable for 
the payment of death benefits. The WCFU, BB&B's workers 
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compensation insurer, was directed to pay the benefits subject to 
being reimbursed 50% from Mr. Bundy. If Mr. Bundy is insolvent 
or unable to pay the 50%, then the Uninsured Employer's Fund 
("UEF") will be responsible to pay the 50% to WCFU. 
Motions for review were filed by both UEF and Mr. Bundy. 
The UEF filed its motion on June 1, 1993. (R. 269-274). Mr. 
Bundy filed his motion on June 7, 1993. (R. 237-263). BB&B and 
WCFU filed a responsive memorandum supporting the reasoning of 
the administrative law judge. (R. 264-268). 
The Industrial Commission issued its Order Granting Motion 
for Review on March 22, 1994. (R. 275-282). The Industrial 
Commission adopted the Findings of Fact contained in the 
administrative law judge's order, and made the additional finding 
that "Phillipson was performing the work of BB&B on the date of 
his fatal industrial accident." (R. 275). The Industrial 
Commission then concluded that Mr. Phillipson was a loaned 
employee solely in the service of BB&B at the time of the fatal 
industrial accident, and that consequently Mr. Bundy and UEF are 
not liable to participate in the payment of death benefits with 
WCFU. (R. 278). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts indicate clearly that at the time of the accident, 
Mr. Phillipson was in the employ of BB&B only. Mr. Phillipson 
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had been dispatched by BB&B to make the trip he was on when the 
accident occurred. (R. 105, 408). At the time of his fatal 
injury, Mr. Phillipson was performing the work of BB&B. 
(R.275). This fact is not disputed by the Petitioners WCFU or 
BB&B. (Petitionees Brief at 6.) Mr. Phillipson was driving Mr. 
Bundy's truck which had been leased to BB&B. (R. 104; R. 109, 
Ex.E-1). The lease agreement had been drafted by BB&B, (R. 407), 
and provided that BB&B would procure and maintain in force a 
policy of workers compensation insurance. (Lease Agreement, 
J[ 10A; R. 329-340; Addendum 3 attached hereto). It also provided 
the following: 
1* That the leased truck was engaged exclusively in the 
service of BB&B, and all transports performed with the truck were 
under the "direction of and under exclusive control and 
supervision of the Lessee [BB&B]." (Lease Agreement, f 2, R. 
329-340; Addendum 3 attached hereto.) 
2. That Mr. Bundy would locate drivers, but that "Lessee 
[BB&B] shall have the complete care, custody and control of both 
the Leased Equipment and drivers furnished therewith," with 
certain exceptions stated. (Lease Agreement f 3; R. 329-340; 
Addendum 3 attached hereto). 
3* That Mr. Bundy, pursuant to the exceptions referred to 
in the preceding paragraph, had purported responsibility for 
"hiring, setting the wages, hours and working conditions of and 
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adjusting the grievances of, supervision, training, disciplining 
and firing of all drivers . . . " (Lease Agreement f 3A; R. 329-
340; Addendum 3 attached hereto). However, the lease gave BB&B 
absolute veto authority over the selection and use of drivers, 
providing that Mr. Bundy "shall furnish to [BB&B] a list of [Mr. 
Bundy's] qualified drivers and any supporting documentation 
relating thereto that [BB&B] may, from time to time, reasonably 
request. [BB&B] is hereby granted the right to request [Mr. 
Bundy] not to use any particular driver, and upon such request 
from [BB&B], [Mr. Bundy] shall comply therewith" (Lease 
Agreement f 4F; R. 329-340; Addendum 3 attached hereto). 
4. That BB&B retained the exclusive right to dispatch the 
driver, make job assignments and to require detailed reports of 
each trip. (Lease Agreement, flfl 3, 6; R. 329-340; Addendum 3 
attached hereto). 
5. That BB&B would procure and maintain in force policies 
of insurance policies and insurance covering personal injury and 
"Workmen's Compensation Insurance." (Lease Agreement, 5 10A; R. 
329-340; Addendum 3 attached hereto). 
6. That all loads hauled by Mr. Phillipson had to be 
approved by BB&B and that Mr. Phillipson must call BB&B to check 
in before 10:00 a.m. Mountain Time, Monday through Friday, (Lease 
Agreement f 11(b); R. 329-340; Addendum 3 attached hereto). 
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Mr. Bundy testified that while he had located Mr. 
Phillipson, BB&B had the right of control to exercise power over 
his decisions, and that in reality Mr. Bundy had merely the 
initial responsibility to provide a driver. (R. 388, 393). Mr. 
Bundy also testified that BB&B, pursuant to the lease, had the 
right to veto his choice of any driver selected for the leased 
vehicle. (R. 394). He also testified that BB&B had agreed in 
the lease to provide workers compensation insurance for the 
drivers of his truck. (R. 396). 
BB&B did in fact assign Mr. Phillipson and its other drivers 
regarding pick ups, deliveries, transports and dispatches. 
(R. 408). On each of Mr. Phillipson's trips, he was required to 
report in to BB&B on a very regular basis concerning his 
whereabouts at all times. (R. 230, Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Order, Addendum 1 attached hereto; R. 365, 367, 375). 
Mr. Phillipson was not required to report in with Mr. Bundy, 
nor did Mr. Bundy have any control over dispatching of Mr. 
Phillipson or his travel routes. (R. 376). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Industrial Commission appropriately utilized the lent-
employee doctrine in resolving this matter. Contrary to the 
arguments of Petitioners, WCFU and BB&B, the lent-employee 
doctrine was argued in Respondent Mark Bundy1 motion for review 
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to the Industrial Commission. Each element of the lent-employee 
doctrine was addressed within the motion. The motion centered 
around the fact that Mr. Phillipson was under the direction of 
BB&B and was obligated to perform the work pursuant to BB&Bfs 
instruction. Mr. Phillipson and BB&B both consented to the 
relationship through their practices. The work Mr. Phillipson 
performed at the time of his death was that of BB&B. Finally, 
BB&B retained the right to control the details of Mr. 
Phillipson1s work performance. Each of these elements was argued 
in the motion for review. The elements and the intended result 
of Mr. Bundy's motion for review to the Industrial Commission are 
the very substance of the lent-employee doctrine. To reject the 
Industrial Commission's consideration of this argument would 
entail excessive reliance on legal formalism over substance. 
Assuming for the sake of argument that the parties had not 
raised the elements or effect of the lent-employee doctrine 
before the Industrial Commission, that fact does not prohibit the 
Industrial Commission from basing its decision on grounds not 
raised by the administrative law judge or the parties. The 
Industrial Commission is not an appellate level review. It acts 
as fact finder and applies the law that is appropriate for the 
just resolution of each case. Moreover, Petitioners1 cite no 
authority for their contention that the Industrial Commission may 
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not rely on theories not raised by the parties. Therefore, the 
Industrial Commission was correct in its application of the law. 
Under the lent-employee doctrine, the Industrial Commission 
correctly found that BB&B was Phillipson's sole employer. The 
elements of the lent-employee doctrine involve a three part test. 
These elements consider the existence of an express or implied 
contract of hire between the employee and the special employer, 
whether the work being done is that of the special employer, and 
whether the special employer has the right to control the details 
of the work. When these conditions apply to both employers, the 
employers are jointly liable. However, when these conditions 
apply to only one employer, that employer is solely liable. 
Mark Bundy yielded complete control and custody of the truck 
and Mr. Phillipson as its driver to BB&B pursuant to the lease 
agreement drafted by BB&B. The work being done at the time of 
the accident was solely that of BB&B, as found by the Industrial 
Commission. Mr. Phillipson had an implied contract with BB&B 
through his acceptance of the terms under which he drove for them 
over a period of many months. As a result, BB&B was the sole 
employer of Mr. Phillipson and was appropriately held solely 
liable for the workers compensation benefits. The fact that 
Petitioners admitted to BB&B being the statutory employer at the 
beginning of the hearing in this matter is not an exclusive 
determination preventing BB&B from also being found as the sole 
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employer. The decision of the Industrial Commission holding 
Petitioner as solely fully liable for the death benefits in this 
case should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION PROPERLY RELIED ON THE LENT-
EMPLOYEE DOCTRINE IN RESOLVING THIS ACTION. 
Petitioners WCFU and BB&B argue that the Industrial 
Commission erred in applying the lent-employee doctrine because 
it allegedly had not been raised by any of the parties. However, 
the lent-employee doctrine was not a new doctrine conceived by 
the Industrial Commission but was argued in Respondent Mark 
Bundyfs motion for review to the Industrial Commission. 
Moreover, even it if was a legal theory not argued by the 
parties, which Mr. Bundy disputes, the Industrial Commission is 
empowered by statute and by decisions of the Utah Supreme Court 
to take such action in arriving at the correct resolution of this 
case. 
A. THE LENT-EMPLOYEE DOCTRINE WAS NOT A NEW THEORY CONCEIVED 
SOLELY BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, BUT WAS ARGUED IN 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR REVIEW. 
The lent-employee doctrine was not newly raised by the 
Industrial Commission. Each element of the doctrine was argued 
extensively by Mr. Bundy in his Motion for Review to the 
Industrial Commission. Petitioners cite Arthur Larson, Workmenfs 
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Compensation Law, Vol. IB, p. 8-434 (1993), for the requisite 
elements to invoke the lent employee doctrine: 
§ 48.00. When a general employer lends an 
employee to a special employer, the special 
employer becomes responsible for workmen's 
compensation only if: 
(a) the employee has made a contract of hire, 
express or implied with the special employer; 
(b) the work being done is essentially that 
of the special employer; and 
(c) the special employer has the right to 
control the details of the work. 
Each of these elements was argued by Mr. Bundy in his Motion 
for Review. Specifically, Point Two of the Motion for Review, 
entitled "BB&B Transportation was the Decedent's Sole Employer," 
argues each element of the lent employee doctrine. First, the 
Motion states that "BB&B dispatched the decedent. It had the 
sole right to approve or disapprove of his use . . . . The 
decedent was required to file detailed trip reports with BB&B." 
(R. 245). This description of the business arrangement infers an 
implied contract based on mutual consent. See Eaddy v. A.J. 
Metier Hauling & Rigging Co., 325 S.E.2d 581, 284 S.C. 270 
(S.C.App. 1985). The court there stated that "the first part of 
the [lent employee] test is satisfied if the lent employee 
consents to the special employment relationship . . .." Id at 
583. The court also held that consent can be inferred from 
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acceptance of control. Clearly these factors were argued in 
depth by Mr. Bundy in his motion for review to the Industrial 
Commission. Second, the Motion states that "BB&B had the 
exclusive right of control over the decedent's employment 
activities." (R. 245). Third, the Motion states that "[t]he 
decedent was required to file detailed trip reports with BB&B . . 
. BB&B required the drivers to call in to BB&B's offices daily 
while under a dispatch . . . Decedent was under the regular 
control of BB&B in BB&B's course of business." (R. 246). By 
arguing these several points, Mr. Bundy set forth the elements of 
the lent employee doctrine. Mr. Bundy may not have referred to 
the name of the legal doctrine as the "lent employee doctrine," 
but he expressly referred to and argued the effects of the Lease 
Agreement and the rights granted thereunder. (R. 246). 
It is evident that the argument asserted in Point Two of Mr. 
Bundyfs Motion for Review is one concerning the decedent's 
employment status, and that such argument is directed toward 
demonstrating that decedent was a lent employee under the 
exclusive employ of BB&B. The elements and the intended result 
of Mr. Bundy's Motion are the substance of the lent-employee 
doctrine. To reject the Industrial Commission's consideration of 
this argument for the reason that Mr. Bundy failed to state the 
formal name of the legal doctrine, as Petitioners demand, would 
entail excessive reliance on legal formalism and abstraction. 
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See Mullanev v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 698-99 and n.25, 95 S.Ct. 
1881, 1889-1890 and n.25 (1979) (cited favorably in State v. 
Sorenson, 758 P.2d 466 (Utah App. 1988)) (stating that rules 
regarding burden of proof are more "concerned with substance 
rather than . . . formalism"); Cannefax v. Clement, 786 P.2d 
1377, 1390 (Utah App. 1990), afffd 818 P.2d 546 (Utah 1991) 
(Bullock, J., dissenting) (denouncing formalistic interpretation 
of contract language as "a glorification of abstraction for 
abstraction's sake"). 
Mr. Bundy's intention in bringing his Motion for Review was 
to convince the Industrial Commission that at the time of the 
accident, Mr. Phillipson was under an employment relationship 
with BB&B, was under its control and was performing its work. 
The result of Mr. Bundy's intended argument was to have the 
Commission correctly rule that BB&B was the sole employer of Mr. 
Phillipson. These are the very substance and effect of the lent-
employee doctrine. Accordingly, the issue was addressed by the 
parties before the Industrial Commission. 
B. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION IS NOT CONSTRAINED BY THE FINDINGS 
OF FACT OR CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REACHED BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW JUDGE, AND THEREFORE MAY BASE ITS DECISION ON GROUNDS 
NOT ADDRESSED BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE OR THE 
PARTIES. 
Petitioners allege that the Industrial Commission 
"introduce[d] a completely new theory not raised by any party at 
the motion for review stage of the proceedings." Brief of Pet. 
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at 24. As a result, they demand that any such theory "simply 
should be considered waived . . .." Id. Petitioners argue that 
the allegedly new theory of the "lent-employee doctrine," which 
is discussed at length in the Industrial Commission Order, should 
be rejected and that the Industrial Commission be "admonished." 
Id. As demonstrated supra, the Industrial Commission did not 
advance a new theory. The issue had been thoroughly argued by 
Mr. Bundy. However, even if the issue had not been raised, the 
Industrial Commission has the discretion to apply the law that is 
appropriate for the just resolution of a case. 
The procedural rules applicable to the Industrial Commission 
when it performs the function of agency review are different from 
those applicable to an appellate court.1 Specifically, the Utah 
Supreme Court has stated that: 
[T]here is nothing in our statutes which 
limits the power of the [Industrial] 
Commission itself in reviewing and adopting 
or reversing the findings of its 
Administrative Law Judge. Those Courts which 
have dealt with this question have uniformly 
held that an administrative tribunal, sitting 
en banc, is not limited by the examiner's 
findings, though, generally it must consider 
those findings as a part of the record as a 
whole. 
While it appears that an appellate court may not be 
able to use new legal theories on which to base its holdings, see 
Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Assoc., 461 P.2d 290, 295, 22 
Utah 2d 222 (Utah 1969) (Henriod, J., dissenting), those limits 
do not apply to an administrative agency's review. 
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U.S. Steel Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 607 P.2d 807, 810 
(Utah 1980). The Utah Code also indicates that an agency, in 
performing its review function, is not constrained by the record, 
but may issue its own findings of facts and conclusions of law as 
to each of the issues reviewed and indicate the reasons for its 
decision. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12(6)(c)(iii), (iv) and (vii). 
The Utah Supreme Court has further held that "[o]ur statutes 
place the responsibility for decision on the Commission, and not 
on Administrative Law Judges." U.S. Steel Corp. 607 at P.2d at 
811. Thus, pursuant to its responsibility the Commission must 
base its decision on appropriate grounds, and these may include 
grounds that were not addressed by the Administrative Law Judge 
in his/her decision. See Dept. of Public Safety v. Jones. 578 
P.2d 1197, (Okl. 1978) (cited favorably by the Utah Supreme Court 
in U.S. Steel Corp. at 811). 
II. UNDER THE LENT-EMPLOYEE DOCTRINE, BB&B WAS PHILLIPSON'S 80LE 
EMPLOYER. 
Under the lent-employee doctrine, BB&B was Phillipson's sole 
employer and therefore is solely responsible for workmen's 
compensation benefits. The proper analysis of the employment 
status of Mr. Bundy and BB&B is under the lent employee doctrine. 
The Industrial Commission properly applied the lent employee 
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doctrine in this case in finding that BB&B was the decedent's 
sole employer for purposes of workmen's compensation. 
The lent employee doctrine, as stated above, involves a 
three part test: 
§ 48.00. When a general employer lends an 
employee to a special employer, the special 
employer becomes responsible for workmen's 
compensation only if: 
(a) the employee has made a contract of hire, 
express or implied with the special employer; 
(b) the work being done is essentially that 
of the special employer; and 
(c) the special employer has the right to 
control the details of the work. 
Workmen's Compensation Law at 8-434. The treatise continues to 
explain: "When all three of the above conditions are satisfied in 
relation to both employers, both employers are liable for 
workmen's compensation." Id. (Emphasis added.) When the 
conditions apply to only one employer, there is no joint 
liability. Mr. Phillipson worked under the close supervision and 
direction of BB&B, following its orders and checking in daily. 
Mr. Phillipson and BB&B worked together directly without 
intercession by Mr. Bundy. Thus, both BB&B and Mr. Phillipson 
consented to the implied contract between them. Eaddv v. A.J. 
Metier Hauling & Rigging Co., supra. Moreover, the Industrial 
Commission expressly found that at the time of his death, Mr. 
Phillipson was performing the work of BB&B, not Mr. Bundy. That 
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finding is not challenged by Petitioners, and is fatal to their 
interpretation of the lent-employee doctrine and the so-called 
joint employer doctrine they rely on. Finally, BB&B retained 
exclusive control over Mr. Phillipson's work. Each element 
having been met, BB&B was appropriately found to be the sole 
employer of Mr. Phillipson. 
Petitioners argue that both BB&B and Mr. Bundy meet the 
conditions of the lent employee doctrine as set forth above. 
Therefore, they argue that both BB&B and Bundy should be held 
liable as joint employers under the "joint employment doctrine." 
See Brief of Petitioners, at 18-21. They cite two cases in 
support of their argument, both of which are distinguishable from 
the case on appeal. 
The Petitioners first rely on Kinne v. Industrial 
Commission. 609 P.2d 926 (Utah 1980), which the Administrative 
Law Judge cited merely to recognize the unobjectionable fact that 
"[ajn employee, for the purposes of workmen's compensation, may 
have two employers." (R. at 230 (citing Kinne. at 928)). Kinne 
involved a leased truck and driver, but under different facts 
than those present in this case. In Kinne. the Industrial 
Commission had concluded that the lessee was only a statutory 
employer. Furthermore, the decedent was performing truck 
maintenance at the time of injury, a job that benefited both 
employers' interests. In addition, the lessor had expressly 
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agreed by contract to provide workmen's compensation insurance 
and to direct and control the driver. Under these facts, the 
court in Kinne found that the lessor was and severally liable 
with the lessee for workmen's compensation payments. 
The case on appeal can be distinguished from Kinne on 
several grounds. First, the Industrial Commission has determined 
that BB&B's employment status was not merely statutory employer, 
but was also sole employer for purposes of worker's compensation. 
(R. at 278). Second, the decedent was driving for BB&B and was 
found by the Industrial Commission to be "performing the work of 
BB&B on the date of his fatal industrial accident." (R. at 275). 
The Petitioners do not dispute this finding. Brief of 
Petitioners, at 6. Finally, the agreement between Bundy and BB&B 
expressly states that "Lessee [BB&B] has procured and maintains . 
. . policies of Insurance covering personal injury, (Workmen's 
Compensation Insurance) . . .." (R. at 113). Therefore, the 
facts upon which the ruling in Kinne was based are not existent 
in this case. Indeed, the facts in this case mandate the 
conclusion that the parties are not jointly and severally liable, 
but that BB&B is solely liable for workmen's compensation. 
Petitioners next cite a recent Utah Court of Appeals ruling, 
Aragon v. Clover Club Foods Co., 857 P.2d 250 (Utah App. 1993), 
for the proposition that two companies in a business arrangement 
akin to a joint venture shall be treated as one "employing unit" 
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and that employees of both companies shall be treated as "engaged 
in the same employment." Brief of Petitioners, at 20 (citing 
Aragon, at 255). The Araaon court stated that joint employment 
would be found where the companies were "united for a common 
purpose." Araaon, at 255. Aragon involved one company which was 
a wholly-owned subsidiary of the other. Such an arrangement did 
not exist here. Unlike a joint venture, the purposes of BB&B and 
Mr. Bundy were divergent. The lease contract between BB&B and 
Mr. Bundy is no more akin to the common purpose of a joint 
venture than any arrangement whereby an independent supplier 
leases or sells an item to an independent manufacturer. There 
was no joint venture in the case at hand, and Araaon is not 
dispositive. 
Petitioners note that Professor Larson's treatise states 
that joint employment may be found in "the familiar situation of 
the leased truck and driver," Worker's Compensation Law at 8-
553. However, numerous courts have refused to find joint 
employment in such a situation if services are performed for each 
employer separately, and each employer exercises separate 
control. If control is transferred to the lessee, or the injury 
occurs while the employee is performing service for the lessee, 
courts have held the lessee to be solely liable for worker's 
compensation. Bennett v. Browning, 395 S.E.2d 333, 196 Ga. App. 
158 (Ga. App. 1990) (affirming award of compensation solely 
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against lessee, where the driver's injury arose solely from 
activities performed for the lessee); Eaddv v. A,J. Metier 
Hauling & Rigging Co., 325 S.E.2d 581, 284 S.C. 270 (S.C.App. 
1985). (Although lessor owned the trucks, was responsible for 
maintenance, and paid the driver, court affirmed Industrial 
Commission's decision that lessee was solely liable for workmen's 
compensation on grounds that lessee exercised exclusive control 
over the driver in performing the lessee's work.); Danuser v. 
J.A. Thompson and Son, Inc., 655 P.2d 887, 890, 3 Haw. App. 564 
(Haw. App. 1982) (affirming order of Labor and Industrial 
Relations Appeals Board that lessee of tractor and driver was 
solely responsible for workmen's compensation since driver 
performed only the lessee's work and was directed and controlled 
in the work solely by lessee); Lego v. Workmen's Comp. APP. Bd., 
445 A.2d 1324, 1327, Pa. Comwlth. 593 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982) 
(affirming award of compensation benefits solely by lessee where 
the truck bore the lessee's logo, the lease stated that the truck 
was in the lessee's exclusive possession, the lessee had the 
right to control the route, the lessee required drivers to meet 
certain specifications, even though lessor paid the driver); 
Craig v. Decatur Petroleum Haulers, Inc.. 340 So.2d 1127, 1130 
(Ala. Ct. App. 1976), cert, denied, 340 So.2d 1130 (Ala. 1977) 
(affirming determination that lessee was the sole employer of 
driver even though lessor paid driver's salary and paid for fuel, 
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since lessee could direct lessor to fire driver, could discipline 
him for failing to report, and had sole discretion over driver's 
routes and deliveries). 
In Lester C. Newton Trucking Co. v. Neal, 204 A.2d 393, 8 
Storey 55, 58 Del. 55, (Del. 1964), the Supreme Court of Delaware 
was presented with the precise issue on appeal in this case. 
Neal involved a truck and driver lease similar to the one 
executed between BB&B and Mr. Bundy. As in this case, the lessor 
was responsible for supplying the truck and driver, would fire 
any driver at the direction of lessee, and payment to the driver 
was made through lessor. Lessee had control over the direction 
of the route and the cargo, and controlled the details of the 
driver's employ. The driver was killed in an accident that 
occurred while he was driving a route designated by the lessee. 
All of these facts are identical to the facts in this case. The 
Neal court ruled that because the lessee "had the right to 
control and direct the activities of the employee in the 
performance of the act which caused his injury," the lessee was 
solely liable for workmen's compensation, id., at 395. 
As did the lessor in Neal, Mr. Bundy had surrendered 
exclusive control of Mr. Phillipson to the lessee, BB&B. BB&B 
dispatched the Mr. Phillipson and directed his routes. BB&B had 
the right to approve or disapprove of the use of any driver, and 
could order Mr. Bundy to fire any driver. Mr. Phillipson was 
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required to file detailed reports with BB&B. BB&B required Mr. 
Phillipson to call in to BB&B's office on a daily basis while on 
driving trips. Failure to call in resulted in discipline by 
means of a $50.00 fine. BB&B agreed in the Lease Agreement to 
provide Workerfs Compensation Insurance. It is conceded that Mr. 
Bundy remained the owner of the trucks and was responsible for 
maintenance, fuel cost, and for paying Mr. Phillipson a 
percentage of BB&B's payment to Mr. Bundy. Nevertheless, control 
of the work performed was transferred to BB&B, and Mr. Phillipson 
was performing the work of BB&B at the time of his fatal 
accident. Because of these factors, the Industrial Commission 
correctly determined that BB&B was Mr. Phillipson's sole employer 
for purposes of worker's compensation payments. The Court should 
therefore affirm the Industrial Commission's decision. 
III. BB&B'S DESIGNATION AS A STATUTORY EMPLOYER IS NOT EXCLUSIVE 
DETERMINATION OP ITS STATUS. 
In their Brief, Petitioners contend that the Industrial 
Commission "committed reversible error by failing to recognize a 
stipulation by the parties accepted by the Administrative Law 
Judge that BB&B was the 'statutory employer1 of [decedent].11 
Brief of Petitioners, at 23. Although Petitioners assert that 
"the stipulation by WCF that BB&B was a 'statutory employer' was 
the correct approach to take in this case," they cite no 
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authority supporting this position or that this designation is 
exclusive. Id. 
Petitioners1 attempt to support this argument by asserting 
that the stipulation was "consistent with the basic purposes of 
fair compensation." Id. Petitioners1 attempt to focus on 
whether Mr. Phillipson's heirs will receive compensation is not 
relevant to the issues on this appeal. Like Petitioners, Mr. 
Bundy does not contest the prior determination that the minor 
heirs of Mr. Phillipson are deserving of workmen's compensation. 
That is not the issue before the Court. Rather, the issue on 
appeal is the apportionment of responsibility among the several 
parties. 
BB&B attempts to avoid the full measure of its 
responsibility as the sole employer of decedent at the time of 
his accident by claiming that its status as a statutory employer 
excludes the possibility that in this case, it also assumed 
control sufficient to be the sole employer. Petitioners cite no 
authority for such a proposition. The Administrative Law Judge 
did not view Petitioner BB&B's status as statutory employer as 
exclusive. Indeed, after hearing the admission of BB&B, the 
Administrative Law Judge stated that "there remains an issue with 
respect to whether or not BB&B Transportation, in addition to 
being the statutory employer of the decedent was, in fact, his 
sole employer." (R. at 231). 
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Petitioners1 attempt to use the statutory employer 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-42 as a limitation on legal 
responsibility goes directly against the legislative intent of 
such provisions. As the Utah Supreme Court has recognized, the 
legislature intended that the statutory employer provision would 
"forestall evasion of [workmen's compensation liability] by those 
who might be tempted to subdivide their regular operations among 
subcontractors, thus escaping direct employment relations . . .." 
Bennett v. Industrial Commission. 726 P.2d 427, 431 (Utah 1986). 
See Curtiss v. GSX Corp. of Colorado. 774 P.2d 873, 874 (Colo. 
1989) ("The purpose of these statutory employer provisions is to 
prevent an employer from evading compensation coverage by 
contracting out work instead of directly hiring workers.11). In 
their brief, Petitioners allege that they are willing to accept 
their responsibility, while Mr. Bundy is not. Brief of 
Petitioners at 21. Quite to the contrary, Petitioners here are 
attempting to avoid the full measure of their responsibility 
assumed when BB&B entered the lease agreement with Mr. Bundy. 
The lease provides for exclusive control to rest in BB&B, and 
that control was in fact exercised according to the lease. BB&B 
also assumed the responsibility for insuring Mr. Phillipson under 
workers compensation under the terms of the lease. BB&B 
purchased workers compensation from WCFU. It is now WCFU which, 
in facing the extent of this particular claim, attempts to shirk 
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its full responsibility and place the liability on Mr. Bundy 
while casting itself in a magnanimous light by "conceding" 
responsibility for one half of its actual liability. In Kinne, 
supraf relied upon by Petitioners, the Utah Supreme court 
condemned one employer's attempts to "disclaim his liability for 
compensation benefits in spite of the express terms of the 
agreement making him responsible for such coverage. It is not 
unreasonable to hold a party responsible for obligations he 
assumes by contract." Kinne, 609 P.2d at 928. 
In this appeal, Petitioners are flaunting the purpose of 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-42 by using it as a shield to reduce their 
legal responsibility as sole employer of decedent. Such misuse 
should not be allowed. Instead, the Court should uphold the 
Industrial Commission in looking to the overriding issue of 
whether BB&B was the decedent's sole employer.2 Clearly it was, 
and the Industrial Commission's order should be affirmed. 
In addition, as stated above, the Industrial Commission is 
not compelled to accept either the findings of fact or 
conclusions of law entered by the Administrative Law Judge. See 
U.S. Steel Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 607 P.2d 807, 810 
(Utah 1980). Thus, the Industrial Commission was not required, 
as Petitioners contend, to accept the Administrative Law Judge's 




The Industrial Commission correctly recognized that 
Phillipson was a lent employee of BB&B at the time of his fatal 
accident. Because BB&B had reserved to itself the right of 
control of Mr. Phillipson, and in fact exercised that control, 
BB&B was appropriately found to be the sole employer. The 
decision of the Industrial Commission holding Petitioners solely 
and fully liable for the death benefits in this case should be 
affirmed. 
DATED this 31st day of October, 1994. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
David M. Wahlquist f 
Stuart F. Weed 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 





Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on April 22, 
1993, at 1:00 o'clock p.m.; same being pursuant to 
Order and Notice of the Commission. 
Timothy C. Allen, Presiding Administrative Law 
Judge. 
Applicants were represented by Kevin Sutterfield, 
Attorney at Law. 
Defendant, Mark Bundy was present and represented by 
Stuart Weed, Attorney at Law. 
Defendant, B B & B Transportation was represented by 
Irene Warr, Attorney at Law. 
The defendant, Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, 
was represented by Richard G. Sumsion, Attorney at 
Law. 
The Uninsured Employers Fund was represented by 
Thomas C. Sturdy, Attorney at Law. 
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At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the matter was 
taken under advisement by the Administrative Law Judge. Being 
fully advised in the premises, the Administrative Law Judge is 
prepared to enter the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
At the outset of the evidentiary hearing, the Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah, by and through counsel, notified the 
Administrative Law Judge that it and its insured, B B & B 
Transportation, were stipulating that B B & B Transportation was 
the statutory employer of the decedent, Robert T. Phillipsen. In 
light of the Stipulation, the litigation of the statutory employer 
issue was thus rendered moot. However, there remains an issue with 
respect to whether or not B B & B Transportation, in addition to 
being the statutory employer of the decedent was, in fact, his sole 
employer. Dispositive Motions had previously been filed by the 
parties, which were taken under advisement pending -the conclusion 
of the evidentiary hearing. Therefore, the issues have been well 
briefed. As will appear from the discussion which will follow, the 
Administrative Law Judge found and concluded that the decedent, Mr. 
Phillipsen, had two employers at the time of his death, his common 
law or actual employer, Mark Bundy, and his statutory employer, 
B B & B Transportation. 
The decedent herein, Robert T. Phillipsen, was driving a truck 
owned by Bundy Trucking and leased to B B & B Transportation when 
he was involved in a fatal industrial accident on May 10, 1991. At 
the time of his death, there were four minor children living in his 
home, who were dependent upon him for support, namely, Joshua J. 
Newton, (DOB: 2-22-85), Shayla Marie Phillipsen, (DOB: 7-15-86), 
Stephen Burdell Phillipsen, (DOB: 4-7-88), and Jazmin Danielle 
Phillipsen, (DOB: 1-17-92). The decedent was also married to 
Melanie Phillipsen, who was living with him at the time of his 
death. Melanie Phillipsen filed a claim for workers compensation 
benefits with the Industrial Commission on August 3, 1992. 
Thereafter, the Uninsured Employers Fund, by and through counsel, 
filed a Motion to Dismiss Mrs. Phillipsen's claim on the grounds 
that she did not file the same within one year of the decedents 
date of death as required by §35-1-98. The Administrative Law 
Judge in a letter Order of November 16, 1992, granted the Motion to 
Dismiss on behalf of the Uninsured Employers Fund as to Melanie 
Phillipsen. However, the Administrative Law Judge also found that 
the effects of §35-1-98, are tolled by §78-12-36, with respect to 
the minor dependent children of the deceased. No appeal having 
been taken of that Order, that Order is now the final award of the 
Commission. Based on that Order, the claim was styled as is 
presently provided. 
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At the time of his death, the decedent was averaging $1,978 
per month in wages. Based on the foregoing, the dependents of the 
deceased would be entitled to a base compensation award of $305.00 
per week when rounded to the nearest whole dollar. When the 
dependents allowance is added to the award, the applicants are then 
entitled to the maximum award provided by law of $309.00 per week. 
Since there are four dependents of the deceased, each child shall 
be entitled to an award of $77.25 per week. The benefits to be 
awarded to the minor dependents shall be placed in trust accounts 
at the Mountain America Credit Union, and shall be disbursed only 
upon a written showing of need. Upon reaching the age of eighteen, 
the balance found remaining in each account shall become the sole 
property of that child. The total award for the initial six years 
shall be $96,408.00, which would entitle each child to an award of 
$24,102.00 for the first six years of benefits. 
As intimated earlier, the remaining issues in this case 
involve whether or not the applicant was the sole employee of 
B B & B Transportation, and if not, if the Uninsured Employers Fund 
is jointly and severally liable along with Mr. Bundy and the 
statutory employer, for the benefits in this case. The defendant, 
Mark Bundy, points to the Lease Agreement as between himself and 
the defendant, B B & B Transportation as support for his position 
that B B & B Transportation was the sole employer, in fact, of the 
applicant. As a related issue, Bundy also argues that because of 
Exhibit D-3, which is an Independent Contractor Agreement between 
Bundy and the deceased, Bundy urges that the applicant was also an 
independent contractor. 
That Agreement in its Recital section indicates that the 
contract is being made between the owner, Mark Bundy, and Mr. 
Phillipsen, who is denominated as a contractor. The Recital 
section indicates that the owner owns certain trucks and trucking 
equipment and operates a truck ownership business and that he 
desires Phillipsen as the contractor, to perform the services of 
trucking and truck driving. For these services, the Agreement 
provides that the decedent would receive 20% of the revenue 
generated by the load taken, and that he would receive dispatches 
from B B & B Transportation. The Agreement in its "Relationship 
of Parties" section states the following provision: "The parties 
intend this contract to create an employer - independent contractor 
relationship." The Agreement concludes that the decedent would 
hold Bundy harmless from any and all liability for workers 
compensation or any other liability which might be subsequently 
imposed on Bundy. This particular provision of the contract 
appears to be void on its face since it would appear to run 
contrary to the provisions of §35-1-90, Utah Code Annotated. That 
section provides that: "No agreement by an employee to waive his 
rights to compensation under this title shall be valid." The 
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Agreement goes on to provide that Bundy will supply the truck and 
equipment, and will provide for all maintenance for the equipment. 
In reviewing the Agreement and the evidence on the file, it 
would appear that there was no negotiation of the various terms of 
that Agreement. It would further appear that the parties did not 
possess equal bargaining power, in that Bundy owned the truck, 
while the only asset that Phillipsen possessed was his ability to 
drive truck. 
This issue of the effect of an independent contractor 
agreement executed by a driver has been previously addressed by the 
Utah Supreme Court in the matter of Harry L. Young & Sons v. 
Ashton. P2d 316 (Utah 1975) . In the Ashton case, the Court 
addressed the legal effect of an "Independent Contractor Agreement" 
similar to that executed by Bundy and the decedent in this matter. 
There the Court indicated: 
It should be had in mind that the issue is not 
whether Dennis A. Ashton was an employee of 
Young in the dictionary sense, nor is it to be 
determined solely from the terms used. 
Particularly, its character is not necessarily 
fixed by the fact that the agreement recites 
that it is not an employer - employee 
relationship, but is that of an independent 
contractor. The question of entitlement to 
workman's compensation depends on whether the 
facts and circumstances bring him within the 
requirements of the Workmens Compensation Act. 
The applicable statutory provision which governs this case is 
found in §35-1-42 (5)(a), which provides: 
* * * 
5) (a) If any person who is an employer procures 
any work to be done wholly or in part for 
him by a contractor over whose work he 
retains supervision or control, and this 
work is a part or process in the trade or 
business of the employer, the contractor, 
all persons employed by him, all 
subcontractors under him, and all persons 
employed by any of these subcontractors, 
are considered employees of the original 
employer. 
1
 / \s «^A* fc 
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Section 42, in subsection (2)(b) defines the term independent 
contractor: 
"Independent contractor" means any person 
engaged in the performance of any work for 
another who, while so engaged, is independent of 
the employer in all that pertains to the execution 
of the work, is not subject to the rule or control 
of the employer, is engaged only in the performance 
of a definite job or piece of work, and is 
subordinate to the employer only in effecting a 
result in accordance with the employer's design. 
The Court in Ashton went on to state: 
Speaking in generality: an employee is one who 
is hired and paid a salary, a wage, or at a 
fixed rate, to perform the employer's work as 
directed by the employer and who is subject to 
a comparatively high degree of control in 
performing those duties. In contrast, an 
independent contractor is one who is engaged 
to do some particular project or piece of 
work, usually for a set total sum, who may do 
the job in his own way, subject to only 
minimal restrictions or controls and is 
responsible only for its satisfactory 
completion. 
To provide guidance in this area, the Court set forth the 
following parameters: 
The main facts to be considered as bearing on 
the relationship here are: (1) Whatever 
covenants or agreements exist concerning the 
right of direction and control over the 
employee, whether express or implied; (2) The 
right to hire and fire; (3) The method of 
payment, i.e., whether in wages or fees, as 
compared to payment for a complete job or 
project; and (4) The furnishing of the 
equipment. (Citation omitted). 
In applying the foregoing legal requirements to the facts of 
this case, I find that as the Court found in Ashton. that although 
the parties recited in their lease that they had an independent 
contractor relationship, the employee, Mr. Phillipsen, had no real 
choice. Mr. Phillipsen was paid 20% of the revenue generated for 
the load that he took, and there was no evidence offered to 
indicate that he had any negotiation or bargaining power whatsoever 
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with respect to that term of the agreement. Further, the truck Mr. 
Phillipsen was driving was owned by Mark Bundy. There was no 
provision in the contract whereby Mr. Phillipsen could refuse to 
haul a load or an oversized load for that matter. Further, Mr. 
Bundy had the governor mechanism repaired on the truck that Mr. 
Phillipsen was driving, so that Mr. Phillipsen could not exceed a 
certain speed limit. With respect to the relationship between Mr. 
Bundy and Mr. Phillipsen, Mr. Bundy also retained the power of 
control over the decedent. Although the Independent Contractor 
Agreement did not retain that power, Mr. Bundy retained that power 
in a separate lease agreement he executed in 1990, with B B & B 
Transportation. In that agreement, Mr. Bundy was to furnish a 
driver and was to "have full and exclusive responsibility for. . . 
hiring, setting the wages, hours and working conditions of and 
adjusting the grievances of, supervising, training, disciplining 
and firing of all drivers. . . ", 1990 (Lease at I 3 (A)). 
Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge finds that this case 
represents the fact situation anticipated by the Supreme Court when 
it made its observation that: 
The employer wanted the "best of two possible 
worlds." On the one hand to have a person 
rendering a service over whom he can maintain 
a high degree of control, and at the same time 
give the person the status of an independent 
contractor to avoid the responsibilities he 
would have to an employee. 
Based on the foregoing discussion, I find and conclude that 
Robert T. Phillipsen was an employee of Mark Bundy Trucking on May 
10, 1991, when he sustained his fatal compensable industrial 
accident. 
As indicated just previously, there was a separate Lease 
Agreement as between Mark Bundy and B B & B Transportation. That 
Agreement provided that Bundy, as the owner-operator of certain 
trailers and 18 wheel tractors, would furnish that equipment to 
B B & B Transportation. That Agreement provided that B B & B 
Transportation would "Have complete care, custody and control of 
both the leased equipment and the drivers furnished therewith. . ." 
(Lease at J 3). That Agreement also provided that B B & B« 
Transportation would furnish the general and workers compensation 
coverage (Lease at J 10,) and would require that all drivers check 
in with B B & B Transportation before making any trip (Lease at 
5 11). The agreement went on to provide that Bundy would pay all 
equipment expenses including fuel, oil, repairs, taxes and license 
fees (Lease at J 3 (D)) . And that Bundy shall: "Have full and 
exclusive responsibility for. . . hiring, setting the wages, etc., 
of the drivers." Based on the foregoing provisions of the Lease 
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Agreement between himself and B B & B Transportation, Bundy urges 
that B B & B Transportation was the sole employer of the decedent. 
However, by the very terms of his Lease Agreement with B B & 
B Transportation, Bundy retained the right of control over the 
activities of the decedent, Phillipsen, The surviving spouse of 
the decedent testified that she took approximately ten trips with 
the decedent and on each of those trips, the decedent was required 
to report in tc B B & B Transportation on a very regular basis 
concerning his whereabouts at all times. The payment arrangement 
between the parties was such that B B & B Transportation would pay 
Bundy 85% of the revenue generated for the load taken 
decedent, and Bundy, in turn, would pay Phillipsen his 20% share of 
the revenue generated. Therefore, under the terms of the 1990 
Lease Agreement, Bundy had the right of control over Phillipsen, 
and he also had the right to hire and fire Phillipsen. In 
addition, Bundy paid Phillipsen's wages, and he owned and leased 
the tractor and trailer used by Phillipsen in the performance of 
his duties. Based on these factors, and in reliance on the Supreme 
Court decision in the matter of Charles Kinne v. Industrial 
Commission. 609 P2d 926 (Utah 1980), I find and conclude that Mark 
Bundy is jointly and severally liable with B B & B Transportation 
for the compensation award in this matter. I find, as the Court 
did in Kinne, that: "An employee, for the purpose of workmen's 
compensation may have two employers." 
One final issue involves the relationship of the Uninsured 
Employers Fund and whether or not i t has liability for benefits in 
this matter, since the uninsured employer, Mark Bundy, has been 
assessed with joint and several liability. The Uninsured Employers 
Fund relies upon its reading of §35-1-107 (1 ) , ti :> conclude that 
they have no liability. Section 35-1-107 (1), states: 
There is created an Uninsured Employers Fund. 
The Fund has the purpose of assisting in the 
payment of workers compensation benefits to 
any person entitled to them, if that person's 
employer is individually-iointly, or severally 
liable to pay the benefits, but becomes or is 
insolvent, appoints or has appointed a 
receiver, or otherwise does not have 
sufficient funds, insurance, sureties, or 
other security to cover workers compensation 
liabilities. If it becomes necessary to pay 
benefits, the Fund is liable for all 
obligations of the employer as set forth in 
Title 35, Chapters 1 and 2, with the 
exceptions of penalties on those obligations. 
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The Uninsured Employers Fund takes the position that n 
only secondarily liable, and that the statutory employer, B B < 
Transportation is primarily liable for benefits, and that the 
Uninsured Employers Fund only has liability in the event that the 
statutory employer and the uninsured employer are unable to pay 
benefits. That reading of §35-1-107, seems to give no effect 
whatsoever to the 1988 amendment to §35-1-107. The 1988 amendment 
struck the qualifier every which appeared before employer in §35-1-
107. In the pre-1988 version of §107, the Act provided that the 
Uninsured Employers Fund had no liability unless every employer of 
the applicant was insolvent. The Legislature in the 1988 amendment 
specifically removed the word every from that statute. I can only 
conclude that the intent of the Legislature in removing the word 
every was to overcome the effects of the decision in Jacobsen v. 
Industrial Commission. 738 P2d 658, (Utah 1987). 
In tiidu wb^ Uninsured Employers Fund and the Workers 
Compensation Fund oi t Jtah litigated whether or not every employer 
of the applicant had to be insolvent before the Uninsured Employers 
Fund would have liability. In that case, the Court found that the 
term every meant what :i I: said, and, as such,, Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah was assessed liability in that case, 
since only the uninsured employer was insolvent. The Administra-
tive Law Judge can only presume that in order to overcome the 
ruling in the Jacobsen case, the Legislature, in its infinite 
wisdom, removed the requirement that every employer be insolvent 
before Uninsured Employer Fund liability would be trigger2d. To 
adopt the position of the Uninsured Employers Fund which was urged 
at hearing, would mean that the Administrative Law Judge by 
administrative fiat and decision would repeal the 1988 amendment to 
§35-1-107. That step this Administrative Law Judge will not take. 
Therefore, I find that based on my reading of §35-1-107, it would 
appear that the Uninsured Employers Fund has joint and several 
liability with the statutory employer upon the uninsured employer 
being unable to pay benefits i n a case. 
Applying the foregoing reasoning to this case, I find that the 
death benefits to be awarded to the minor dependents shall be paid 
in the first instance by the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, and 
the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah shall be entitled to 50% 
reimbursement from Mark Bundy. In the event Mark Bundy is without 
sufficient assets or surities to pay his portion of the award, then 
the Uninsured Employers Fund, pursuant to §107 of the Act, shall 
then step in and make the payments in Bundy's stead. . 
The applicants herein, have had the benefit of legal counsel 
in these proceedings. As a result, counsel is entitled to a fee 
for his services. The attorneys fee rule provides that the maximum 
fee payable on a workers compensation case is $7,500.00. Based on 
the amount recovered for the applicants, counsel is entitled to the 
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maximum fee. That fee shall be deducted equally from each of the 
applicant's benefits, which will result i n a deduction of $1 ,875 ,00 
from each child's accrued award. 
CONCLUSIONS OF : 
Robert T. Phillipsen was an employee of Mark Bundy dba Mark 
Bundy Trucking on May 10, 1991# when he sustained his fatal 
industrial accident. In addition, Robert T. Phillipsen was a 
statutory employee of B B & B Transportation on May 10, 1991, when 
he sustained his fatal industrial accident. B B & B Transportation 
and Mark Bundy are jointly and severally liable for the death 
benefits due and owing to the applicants as the result of the 
industrial accident sustained by Robert T. Phillipsen on May 10, 
1991, during the course and scope of his employment. Pursuant to 
§35-1-107, the Uninsured Employers Fund is jointly and severally 
liable with the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah for death 
benefits in this matter in the event, Mark Bundy is insolvent or 
lacks sufficient assets or sureties to satisfy his portion of the 
award <« i-hi« matter-
ORDER: 
IT THEREFORE ORDERED that Mark Bundy and/or 
Transportation/Workers Compensation Fund of Utah pay Mountain 
America Credit Union, $24,102.00, for deposit in share account 
#74787-2, which account has as its owner, Joshua J. Newton. No 
disbursements shall be made from the account without the written 
authorization of the Commission upon a showing of need. The 
benefits awarded herein shall commence effective May 11, 1991, at 
the rate of $77.25 per week, and shall terminate on or about May 2, 
1997. Accrued amounts shall be paid in a lump sum including 
interest of 8% per annum. The defendants shall deduct $1,875.00 
from the accrued award to Joshua, and shall remit the same to Kevin 
Sutterfield, attorney for the applicants, for services rendered in 
this matter. 
IT IS FURTHER 0RDERED that Mark Bundy a n dy o r fi B & B 
Transportation/Workers Compensation Fund of Utah pay Mountain 
America Credit Union, $24,102.00, for deposit :i i i share account 
#74788-0, which account has as its owner, Shayla M. Phillipsen. No 
disbursements shall be made from the account without the written 
authorization of the Commission upon a showing of need. The 
benefits awarded herein shall commence effective May 11, 1991, at 
the rate of $77.25 per week, and shall terminate on or about May 2, 
1997. Accrued amounts shall be paid in a lump sum including 
interest of 8% per annum. The defendants shall deduc*" ei ,875.00 
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from the accrued award to Shay la, and shall remit the same to Kevin 
Sutterfield, attorney for the applicants, for services rendered in 
this matter. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mark Bundy and/or B B & B 
Transportation/Workers Compensation Fund of Utah pay Mountain 
America Credit Union, $24,102.00, for deposit in share account 
#74789-8, which account has as its owner, Stephen B. Phillipsen. 
No disbursements shall be made from the account without the written 
authorization of the Commission upon a showing of need. The 
benefits awarded herein shall commence effective May 11, 1991, at 
the rate of $77.25 per week, and shall terminate on or about May 2, 
1997. Accrued amounts shall be paid in a lump sum including 
interest of 8% per annum. The defendants shall deduct $1,875.00 
from the accrued award to Stephen, and shall remit the same to 
Kevin Sutterfield, attorney for the applicants, for services 
rendered in this matter. 
I T I S F U R T H E R ORDERED that Mark Bundy and/or B B & B 
Transportation/Workers Compensation Fund of Utah pay Mountain 
America Credit Union, $24,102.00, for deposit in share account 
#74790-6, which account has as its owner, Jazmin D. Phillipsen. No 
disbursements shall be made from the account without the written 
authorization of the Commission upon a showing of need. The 
benefits awarded herein shall commence effective May 11, 1991, at 
the rate of $77.25 per week, and shall terminate on or about May 2, 
1997. Accrued amounts shall be paid in a lump sum including 
interest of 8% per annum. The defendants shall deduct $1,875.00 
from the accrued award to Jazmin, and shall remit the same to Kevin 
Sutterfield, attorney for the applicants, for services rendered in 
this matter. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mountain America Credit Union mail 
quarterly statements to the children c/o Melanie Phillipsen, 148 
West 100 North, #A-1# Nephi, UT 84648. Mrs. Phillipsen shall 
furnish Mountain America Credit Union with social security numbers 
for the children to facilitate the reporting of interest income, 
and she is responsible for the filing of any required income tax 
returns. 
IT ±S FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, Mark Bundy and/or 
B B & B Transportation/Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, shall pay 
Kevin Sutterfield, attorney for the applicants, the sum of 
$7,500.00, for services rendered in this matter, the same to be 
deducted from the aforesaid awards to the children as previously 
provided. 
II IS FURTHER ORDERED tha* about March xw /, the 
Workers Compensation Fund sha' id ration Dependency 
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forms „ Melanie Phillipsen prior to the termination Df the 
benefits awarded to the children herein. Thereafter, the children 
will be entitled to continuing death benefits from the defendants 
less an offset for 50% of the Social Security death benefits 
received by them at that time. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the benefits awarded herein shall 
be paid in full in the first instance by the Workers Compensation 
Fund of Utah. The Workers Compensation Fund shall thereafter be 
entitled to reimbursement for 50% of the benefits paid in this 
matter from Mark Bundy on a quarterly basis Ii i the event Mark 
Bundy is without sufficient assets or sureties or is insolvent and 
is therefore unable to pay his 50% portion of the benefits in this 
matter, then the Uninsured Employers Fund shall make those payments 
for Bundy, and they shall reimburse the Workers Compensation Fund 
of Utah on a quarterly basis. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the 
date hereof# specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not 
subject to review or appeal. 
c\ 
lien 
dministrati ve I i judge 
Certified this £,r^ day 
May, 1993. 
ATTEST: 
Patricia 0. Ashby j ^J_ 
Commission Secretary 
*• i 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on May {p*
 1993^ a c o p y o f t h e 
attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, in the 
case of Robert T. Phillipsen, Deceased, was mailed to the following 
persons at the following addresses, postage paid: 
Melanie Phillipsen 
148 West 100 North 
Nephi, UT 84648 
Kevin sutterfield 
Attorney at Law 
P 0. Box 778 
t i: ::> \ i ::>, UT 84603 
Mark Bundy Trucking 
P. 0. Box 192 
Nephi, UT 8464ft 
Stuart Weed 
Attorney at Law 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800 
SLC, UT 84111-1004 
B Transportation 
Box 7061 
- "V. UT 8* 
Thomas Sturdy 
Attorney at Law 
Uninsured Employers Fund 
Richard G* Sums ion 
Attorney at Law 
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah 
P. 0. Box 57929 
SLCf UT 84157 




THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6600 
JOSHUA J. NEWTON, Minor Dependent * 
Stepson of, and SHAYLA MARIA * 
PHILLIPSON, STEPHEN BURDELL * 
PHILLIPSON, and JAZMIN DANIELLE * 
PHILLIPSON, Minor Dependent * 




MARK BUNDY dba MARK BUNDY TRUCKING * 
(uninsured), BB & B TRANSPORTATION * 
and/or WORKERS' COMPENSATION FUND * 
OF UTAH, UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND,* 
Respondents. * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
The Industrial Commission of Utah (ffCommission") reviews the 
motion for review of the applicant in the above captioned matter, 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-82.53 and Section 63 
-46b-12. 
The minor dependent children of Robert T. Phillipson 
("applicants") filed a claim for workers' compensation death 
benefits pursuant to the industrially caused death of their father. 
BB & B Transportation ("BB & B") stipulated that it was the 
statutory employer of Mr. Phillipson. The administrative law judge 
("ALJ") found that the Mark Bundy dba Bundy Trucking ("Bundy") was 
Mr. Phillipson's common law or actual employer and ordered that the 
liability for the payment of benefits be shared jointly and 
severally between Bundy and BB & B. The ALJ ordered that benefits 
to be paid initially by the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah 
("WCFU"), BB & B's insurer, with a right to recover 50% of the 
benefits paid from Bundy. If Bundy does not have sufficient assets 
to pay his 50% portion of benefits, the Uninsured Employers' Fund 
("UEF") was ordered to make the payments for Bundy. 
Respondent Bundy filed a motion for review asserting that BB 
& B was the sole employer of Phillipson and that Phillipson was an 
independent contractor to Bundy. The UEF filed a motion for review 
of that portion of the order which ordered the UEF to pay benefits 
if Bundy is unable to pay his share of the award. 
We hereby adopt the findings of fact contained in the 
administrative law judge's order of May 6, 1993 with the following 
additional finding: 
1. Phillipson was performing the work of BB & B on the date of 
his fatal industrial accident. 
ORDER 
GRANTING 
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I. WAS BB & B PHILLIPSON'S SOLE EMPLOYER? 
Bundy argues that BB & B was Phillipson's sole employer and, 
therefore, solely liable for his workers' compensation benefits. 
It appears that the Lease Agreement between Bundy and BB & B 
provides that Bundy lease a truck and loan a driver to BB & B. A 
loaned employee may be the employee of either the general employer 
or the special employer depending upon the circumstances of the 
case.1 According to Professor Larson, the general employer will be 
presumed liable unless it can be shown that the special employer 
has been substituted for the general employer. To overcome the 
presumption, the evidence must show: (1) a contract of hire 
between the special employer and the employee; (2) proof that the 
work being done at the time of injury was essentially the work of 
the special employer; and (3) proof that the special employer 
assumed the right to control the details of the work. Id. at 8-
457. 
Utah courts have determined that the right to supervision and 
control is the most important factor for determining whether an 
employee/employer relationship exists.2 Utah law further provides 
that a contract between an employee and special employer may be 
implied by conduct of the parties.3 
The decedent and Bundy entered into an agreement whereby 
decedent agreed to ffreceiv[e] dispatches from BB & B 
Transportation." The agreement was entered on January 22, 1991. 
The decedent's spouse testified that she took approximately ten 
trips with the decedent and that on each of those trips the 
decedent was required to report in to BB & B on a regular basis. 
The evidence indicates that the decedent regularly drove for BB & 
B and agreed to an employee/employer relationship between himself 
and BB & B. 
The Lease Agreement stated that BB & B was an "irregular route 
for hire carrier [with ICC authorization to transport] General 
Commodities between points in the Continental United States." The 
decedent regularly operated a truck transporting commodities for BB 
& B and was doing so at the time of his fatal industrial accident. 
Therefore, at the time of his accident, decedent was performing the 
work of BB & B and not Bundy. 
1
 See LARSON'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 48.00. (1992 Ed.) 
2
 Harry L. Young & Sons. Inc. v. Ashton, 538 P.2d 316 (Utah 
1975). 
3
 Bambroucrh v. Bethers. 552 P.2d 1286, 1292 (Utah 1976). 
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The Lease Agreement between Bundy and BB & B provided that 
Bundy "shall furnish a driver or drivers for each unit of the 
Leased Equipment" and that the Lessee (BB & B) "shall have the 
complete care, custody and control of both the Leased Equipment and 
drivers furnished therewith..." (emphasis added). The agreement 
further provides that Bundy "shall have full and exclusive 
responsibility for: (A) hiring, setting the wages, hours and 
working conditions of and adjusting the grievances of, supervising, 
training, disciplining and firing of all drivers..." Thus, BB & B 
had the ultimate right to control the decedent's work. Bundy's 
role was either that of a supervisor for BB & B or an employer who 
retained some control over his loaned employee. Bundy's failure to 
relinquish all control over his loaned employee does not affect the 
application of the loaned servant doctrine. 
BB & B exercised the right to control the loaned employees 
that was granted in the Lease Agreement. BB & B required the 
decedent to report to its dispatcher each day before 10:00 a.m. 
Mountain Time and to haul only loads that BB & B approved. BB & B 
also had the right to refuse to use any driver provided by Bundy. 
These factors support the conclusion that BB & B exercised the 
right to control the work of the decedent. 
The Lease Agreement further provided that BB & B would provide 
workers' compensation insurance. Therefore, a preponderance of 
the evidence supports the conclusion that decedent was a loaned 
employee in the service of BB & B at the time of his fatal 
industrial accident.6 Therefore, the liability for payment of 
4
 "It has never been held by this Court that for the loaned 
servant doctrine to apply, the original employer must completely 
surrender all control over his loaned employee." Bambrouah v. 
Bethers at 1292. 
5
 "It is not unreasonable to hold a party responsible for 
obligations he assumes by contract." Kinne v. Industrial 
Commission, 609 P.2d 926 (Utah 1980). 
6
 This case may be distinguished from Kinne v. Industrial 
Commission. 609 P.2d 926 (Utah 1980) , in which both the truck owner 
and lessee were held liable for benefits. In Kinne. the employee 
was injured while performing truck maintenance, a job which 
benefitted both the truck owner and the lessee. In the present 
case, decedent was performing the work of the lessee at the time of 
his injury. The contract in Kinne provided that the lessor would 
provide workers' compensation insurance and be responsible for the 
direction and control of the drivers. In this case, the contract 
provided that the lessee would provide workers' compensation 
insurance and retain the ultimate right to direct and control the 
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workers' compensation benefits rests solely with BB & B and its 
insurance carrier, the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah. 
CONCLUSION OF LAW: 
We conclude that decedent was a loaned employee solely in the 
service of BB & B at the time of the fatal industrial accident. 
Therefore, Bundy and, by extension, the Uninsured Employers' Fund, 
are not liable for any portion of the benefits awarded. 
We will not address the additional issues raised by the 
parties because they are rendered moot by our decision above. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the findings of fact of the 
administrative law judge are adopted as amended above. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the order of the 
administrative law judge dated May 6, 1993 be amended to read as 
follows: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that BB & B Transportation 
/Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah pay Mountain America 
Credit Union , $24,102.00 for deposit in share account 
#74787-2, which account has as its owner Joshua J. 
Newton. No disbursements shall be made from the account 
without the written authorization of the Commission upon 
a showing of need. The benefits awarded herein shall 
commence effective May 11, 1991, at the rate of $77.25 
per week, and shall terminate on or about May 2, 1997. 
Accrued amounts shall be paid in a lump sum including 
interest of 8% per annum. The defendants shall deduct 
$1,875.00 from the accrued award to Joshua, and shall 
remit the same to Kevin Sutter field, attorney for the 
applicants, for services rendered in this matter. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that BB & B Transportation 
/Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah pay Mountain America 
Credit Union , $24,102.00 for deposit in share account 
#74788-0, which account has as its owner Shayla M. 
Phillipson. No disbursements shall be made from the 
account without the written authorization of the 
Commission upon a showing of need. The benefits awarded 
herein shall commence effective May 11, 1991, at the rate 
of $77.25 per week, and shall terminate on or about May 
2, 1997. Accrued amounts shall be paid in a lump sum 
drivers. 
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including interest of 8% per annum. The defendants shall 
deduct $1,875-00 from the accrued award to Shayla, and 
shall remit the same to Kevin Sutterfield, attorney for 
the applicants, for services rendered in this matter. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that BB & B Transportation 
/Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah pay Mountain America 
Credit Union , $24,102.00 for deposit in share account 
#74789-8, which account has as its owner Stephen B. 
Phillipson. No disbursements shall be made from the 
account without the written authorization of the 
Commission upon a showing of need. The benefits awarded 
herein shall commence effective May 11, 1991, at the rate 
of $77.25 per week, and shall terminate on or about May 
2, 1997. Accrued amounts shall be paid in a lump sum 
including interest of 8% per annum. The defendants shall 
deduct $1,875.00 from the accrued award to Stephen, and 
shall remit the same to Kevin Sutterfield, attorney for 
the applicants, for services rendered in this matter. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that BB & B Transportation 
/Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah pay Mountain America 
Credit Union , $24,102.00 for deposit in share account 
#74790-6, which account has as its owner Jazmin D. 
Phillipson. No disbursements shall be made from the 
account without the written authorization of the 
Commission upon a showing of need. The benefits awarded 
herein shall commence effective May 11, 1991, at the rate 
of $77.'25 per week, and shall terminate on or about May 
2, 1997. Accrued amounts shall be paid in a lump sum 
including interest of 8% per annum. The defendants shall 
deduct $1,875.00 from the accrued award to Jazmin, and 
shall remit the same to Kevin Sutterfield, attorney for 
the applicants, for services rendered in this matter. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mountain America Credit 
Union mail quarterly statements to the children c/o 
Melanie Phillipson, 148 West 100 North, #A-1, Nephi, UT 
84648. Mrs. Phillipson shall furnish Mountain America 
Credit Union with social security numbers for the 
children to facilitate the reporting of interest income, 
and she is responsible for filing any required income tax 
returns• 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, B B & B 
Transportation /Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, shall 
pay Kevin Sutterfield, Attorney for the applicant, the 
sum of $7500.00, for services rendered in this matter, 
the same to be deducted from the aforesaid awards to the 
children as previously provided. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that on or about March 1, 
1997, the Workers' Compensation Fund shall send 
Declaration of Dependency forms to Melanie Phillipson 
prior to the termination of the benefits awarded to the 
children herein. Thereafter, the children will be 
entitled to continuing death benefits from the defendants 
less an offset for 50% of the Social Security death 
benefits received by them at that time. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of 
the foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty 
(30) days of the date hereof, specifying in detail the 
particular errors and objections, and, unless so filed, 
this Order shall be final and not subject to review or 
appeal. 
Any request for reconsideration by the Industrial Commission 
must be filed within 20 days of the date of this Order. A request 
for reconsideration is not required prior to filing an appeal to 
the Utah Court of Appeals. An appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals 
must be filed within 30 days of the date of this Order. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Adell Butler-Mitchell, certify that I did mail by prepaid 
first class postage, except as noted below, a copy of the ORDER 
GRANTING MOTION FOR REVIEW in the case of JOSHUA J. NEWTON & SHAYLA 
MARIA PHILLIPSON, Case Number 92-926 & 92-1132, on A ff/^dav of 
y)i!~-u<cJ--~~ lsHf to the following: n 
MELANIE PHILLIPSEN 
148 WEST 100 NORTH #A-1 
NEPHI, UTAH 84648 
KEVIN SUTTERFIELD 
P O BOX 778 
PROVO, UTAH 84603 
MARK BUNDY TRUCKING 
P 0 BOX 192 
NEPHI, UTAH 846548 
STUART WEED 
60 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE SUITE 1800 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111-1004 
B B & B TRANSPORTATION 
P O BOX 7061 
MURRAY, UTAH 84107 
RICHARD G. SUMSION 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH 
THOMAS STURDY 
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND 
CINDY PETERSON 
MOUNTAIN AMERICA CREDIT UNION 
P O BOX 45001 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145 
T. C. ALLEN 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 
Adell But^ter-Mitchell 
Paralegal 
General Counsel's Office 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
Tab 3 
kHSPOnTATION , . H C ^ ^ ^ ^ 
LEASE AGREEMENT, Exaouttd this /<£ day of v-2J'^LtnMy A^9S by and 
between BBAB, INC./dbaBB&B TRAtePORTAIIOH, IHC. (lessee), t eorperatien 
of Utah, 4154 So* 300 Weet, Hurray, Ut 84107 and 
$(i<{t/y^acki}<i »*(n) ^Jylfct/rf Of 
( leeggQ 
VlTISSSHHl 
VHEREAS, LESSEE is an irregular route for»hire carrier holding 
operating authority issued by the Interstate Qoaseree Oonisaion (ICC) 
in Dookat # HC174343 (and lub numbers thereunder), authoriting the 
transportation of General Commodities betveen points in the Contin-
ental United States| and 
V1EREAS, Bessor controls a aoter vehicle which i s available for 
Losses'a use and suitable for transportation of the specified ootaecdities 
authorised for transportation by Lessee f and 
WHEREAS Lessor desires to lease such vehicle to Lessee of & long-
ters basis and Lessee desires to lease suoh Meter vehicle froi Lessor J 
HOW', 'THERSrcnS, in consideration of abnual agreeasnte and under-
takings contained herein, and on the tare* and conditions expressed belpv 
the parties hereto oov.mant and agree as followst 
1* LEASE OfJSQUIPMENT* Lessor hereby leases to Lessee and Lessee 
hereby accepts froa Use or, j^i^tractorCS) and
 -p-_-_eeai.-trailer(s) 
(ooUeotivly the "leased Equipnsnt") lore fully described on Exhibit "A" 
attached hereto and sade a part of by reference, for the tern specified 
herein, beginning ^Mjlti/alif /6> .19<?£ . 
2. EXCLUSIVE CONTROL IN LS6SEB. The Leased Equipsent i s to be 
engaged exclusively in the service of the Lessee, and the goods trans-
ported therein ehall be transported pursuant to the direction of and 
under exoluaive control and supervision of the Lessee* 0 \ ' o 2 ^ 
EXH!BIT E-1 of n •"DUSTOALCOMMISS.O.M r- . T 
EXHIBfTNO. t ? - / 
iJK&li -
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3« EXCLUSIVE Com PL IN LESSEE. LeiBor ihall furnish a driver or 
drivers far each unit of the Leased Equipment. Lessee shall have the coa-
plete care, ouatody and control of both the Leased Squipnent and driven 
finished therewith) provided however that lessor shall have full aid 
exoluaive responsibility for; 
(A) hiring, setting the wages, hours and working condition* of and 
adjusting the grievances of,supervising, training, disciplining, and firing 
of a l l driverst drivers helpers and other workers neoessary for the per-
foraance of Lessor's obligations under the teres of this Agreeaent, vhLoh 
driver, driver's helpers and other workers are,ani shall be, either the 
aaployees of the Lessor or under the direct econoelo control of the Lea serf 
(B) paying all operating and related expenses far the Leased EquLprtnb, 
including a l l expenses of fuel, oi l and repairs to the Leased Equipnant, road 
taxes, aileage taxes, fines far perking, waving or overweight violationsf 
licenses, permits or any other levies or assessn&ta based upon the oper-
ation of Leased Equipment, and; 
(0) paying and reporting as required by an eaployerf as explained 
acre fully be lew. Subject in each oase to any raquiresents which say be 
placed upon Lessee by applicable statutes, and regulations proaulgatad 
thereunderi I t i s understood by the parties that soae itaaa creating 
the foregoing expenses Bay be arsanged far by the Lessee for LaBBar, as 
expressly described b«lev, and Lessor shall reiaburse Leseee therefore 
instead of paying such expenses directly, as in autually agread by the 
parties fraa tiae to tiae f 
4. HAIHTEHAHCB AH) CONPUAHCE REQUIREMENTS. The parties aekncwlege 
that Leaflet's operations are Subject to regulation by the federal 
government through the ICC and the U#S« Department of Transportation (DOT) 
and by various state and looal governaents* Lesior shall have the respon-
sibility to Leasee for compliance with sueh regulatory requirenents relating 
to the operation of the Leased Equipoentj subject at al l Uses 
to verification by Lessee by) 
(A) mintaining the Leased Equipment pursuant to the Agreeeant in 
the mnner required by all applicable regulations! 
r . w . B W / > i v g i 
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(B) opirating said equipsent In aooprd with-all applicable statutst 
anl regulationsi 
(C) providing theraunisr only those driTtri who srs qualified uaisr 
a l l applioable regulations and oertified thereto by Lessee} 
(D) upon mutual agreeaent between Laaaee and Lasacr» furnishing and 
relinquishing to Lessee the possession) oontrel and use of the actor vehicle 
which Lessee say require to ful l f i l l requireasnts placed upon i t by appli-
oable statuted and regulations) 
(S) perforsanoc of aots necessary to ooaply vith the applioable statues 
and regulations in carrying out i t s dutiss under this agree Bent. 
(7} as part of i ts responsibilities hereunder, Lessor shall furnish 
to Lessee a l i s t of Lessor* s qualified drivers and any supporting docwaan-
tation relating thereto that Lessee cay, fros ties to Use, reasonably 
re que at. Laaaee i s hereby granted the right to request Lessor not to use any 
particular driver and, upon such request froa Leases) Lessor shall ooaply 
therewith. 
5« UNAUTHORIZED USB Or LSA3ftD EQUIPHBHT. Under no oireuastanoaa during 
the tera of this afreeaant shall LB sacr utilise the Laaaed EquLpsamt for 
the transportation of oeasoditiea vhioh Lessee i s not allowed to carry 
under i t s operating authority issued by the ICO in Dookat # HC174343 (or 
any other transportation for vhioh the Lessee i s not authorised under the 
Act and Regulations thereunder)* The parti a a aaJmovledge that auoh unauth-
orised use of the Leased Eqvdpwnt say jeopardise Lesseets oontinued oper-
ations as an authorised carrier far-hire. In the event that Lessor shall 
utilise the Leased Equipsent far auoh unauthorised aervioe and auoh actions 
result in sanations iapoeed upon Leaaee by an/ governaental ant her i t / , 
Lessor shall b* liable %o Lessee for any and all oests and dasages, both 
direct and consequential, pursuant to the provisions of 3action 11 below. 
p.o. BOX roet 
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6. TRIP DOCUMENT ATI OH TO LS3SEB. For each iniividual trip undertaken 
by the Leased Bquipaent, Lessor shall furnish to Lessee, as aoon aa i s 
praetical foil wing the oonpletion of said trip, tht following doouasnt* 
ard informtioni 
(A) Lessee's over-the road trip$eport» 
(B) signed delivery receipts anl reoelpted bills of lading) 
(0) current driver'a chauffer's lieense and aedieal certificate) 
(D) drivers loga (properly completed as required by applicable lav 
anl regulations thereucder)| 
(S) sdlaage report (an exaeple of vhioh i s on trip sheet) 
(F) original- fuel tickets and state fuel reportai (which are to be 
exeouted in the naaa of Lessee)) 
(Q) oopiaa of local, state or federal inspection and violation notioee, 
(H) detention tiae reoords (on a fora acceptable to Leasee asi as 
specified under applicable regulations proaulgated by the ICC, i f the trip 
i s coninoted under eoeaen earrisr authority)) 
(1) suoh FCOjtripor other vehicle inspootion report as nay be required 
by the ICC or DOS 
With reepaet to said inspection re porta,, lessee reserve* the right to pre** 
scribe the fori on vhioh suoh inspections sxs to be reported. Said documents 
and infornation My bo asseabled atd Bailed to Leasee»s principal office, at 
identified, above, in an envelope provided by Leasee. 
7. ROVISIOH OF VRSIOHT BILLS AM BXAWHaTIOW OF TMIITB kW aCHSPUttSt 
Leaser cay exaaine the sohedulas of actual rates and charges and/or tariffs 
vhioh Lesaee has filed with the ICC and froa vhioh the foregoing peroastagaa 
of revenue ere deterained at Lessee* s offioes at 4154 South 300 Vest 
Hurray, Ut« at any tiae during norcal buaiaess hours (8 a«a« to 5 p.a. aonday 
through friday), or i f i t so sleots, the Leasor say subscribe to oopies of 
said schedule s and tariffs by paying to Leasee the proper oharges therefore* 
ASPORTATION, INC. 
8. DEDUCTIOH QT aUHS FCR FREIGHT LOSS trd/or DAHAOl. Lessee r e s a l e s 
tha right to daduot froa any rental pays*) at dua to tha Lessor such suss 
tf Lessee i s requirad to pay to any oonsignor or consignee for lots or 
daaage to any ooaaodities transported by tha Laaiad Cquipaant* Pricr to aaJdng 
auoh deduction, laaaaa shall furnish to Laitcr a eoapiete oopy of tha 
Laaaaaia olaia f i la vith eoplaa of tha documentation upon which tha 
•aid claia vaa paid* 
9. VARnAHTIIsa AM) 1W3SHHIHCATI0H, l a consideration of Leasee's 
agrseaent to lease tha Leased Equip wot, Lessor hereby warrants, covenants 
and agrees to inieanif/, dafani and hold Laaaaa her a]* as froa and against 
a 11 olaies, obligations, l o s t , dacaga, penalities or sxpenasy diraot of 
consequential, ineluiing without l iaitat ion a l l costs and reasonable legal 
faaaf incurved, by Lasaaa, diraotly or indiraotly, froa tha operation of tha 
Leased Bqudpaant during tha tara of this agreeaant aid a l l aots er oadjaioat 
of Lessor, i t s eaplcyeeS) representatives) offloars or assigns) pursuant 
to tha tar as of this agraeaantt including) by way of exaapla and not of 
liadtation t clataa f ines, forfatures and revocations by tha ICO) the DOS 
and/or any other gcvermeantal authority) and claim by third partita 
for personal injury or property daaaujs* 
10. 1H3URAHC8 TIEQUIHSHSHTS, 
(A) It i s underatood and acknowledged by tha partiea that Laaaaa has 
procured and aaintaina in fu l l faro a and a f leet , policies of Insurance 
oorering personal injury) (Vorknen'e Compensation Insurance), property 
daaage and danafa to cargo for the benefit of tha publio as required by 
(9 U.S,C. 8 10927) bovaTar, for the purpose of this Agrsaaent and in order to 
Satisfy tha requiraaents of Section 9i above, the Lessor shall procure and 
anintain, at i t s own expense) publio l iabi l i ty and property daaaga insurance 
fith a total ooabined single Uni t of not lass than $1,000,000 par occuraace, 
ind al l -r isk cargo insurance vith a l iabi l i ty l ia i t of net lass than 
'50,000 par unit of Leased EqttLps»nt# Lessor and i t s insurance carrier(s) 
1 ha 11, by continuing and craeaent, include Lessee on a l l such insurance 
policies aa an additional insured and a hall , pricr to the tiaa that Laaaaa 
takes- poeeeeeion of Leaeed Equipment hereunier, furnish to tha Laaaaa a 
ertifieate or certificates eridancing auch polieies and/or endorseaBnts« 
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If, however, Lessor and i ts insurance oarritr (a) cannot provide auah 
eertifloatea to LaiMa prior to the time Laiaaa takaa possession of tha 
Leased Equipment hereunder, in lieu of such insurance certificates* 
L«!• of and ita insurance carrier ( i) may provide evidence of suoh insurance 
by telegram or other for a of written- coemunication actually delivered to 
Lass** prior to taking suoh posseeaion, and Lessee shall by intitled to 
rely on such telegram or other for a of written communication* Not 
withstanding tha foregoing, i f Lessee accept• suoh talagraphio or other 
written form of evidence, Lessor and ita insurance carrier (a) shall furnish 
the actual certificate cr certificates within five (5) days of tha data 
of exeeution of this Lease Agreement* Prior to cancellation of, nonrenewal 
of, of material ohange in such policies and/or endoraemente, or tba de-
lation of the Leasee aa an additionally insured under auoh policies» upon 
renewal cr otherwise, Lessor and i ts insurance carrier (a) shall furnish 
Lessee with thirty (30) days notice in writing thereof, and Lesser1! 
insurance oarritr (a) shall iniio?.te of the certificate (3) provided to 
Lessee i t s (their) promise to comply with this notice provision* • Anything 
in this agreement to the contrary notwithstanding! for tha purposes of the 
parties to this Agreement, said insurance procured and maintained by the 
Lessor under this Section shall by considered and constitute primary 
insurance coverage* If any of said policies and/or endorsements are 
caneell*4/Or not renewed without notification to Leesee aa required in this 
Station, this Agreement shall be deemed cancelled and terminated as of 
the date of suoh policy and/or endorsement cancellation or expiration* 
(b) Lessor shall hate the option of aatisfying tba requirements of 
Section 9 aboTe by providing insurance aa aet forth in paragraph 10(A) 
or by participating in the insurance coverage program of the Least*• In 
the efent Lessor eleots to satisfy the requirasnts of Section 10 above by 
participating in the existing insurance prograa of Lessee, Lessor shall 
give written notice to Lsssee of the exercise of said option prior to the 
time Lessee takes possession of the Ltased Equipment hereunder* i f said 
option i« exeroieed, Leeser expressly hereby autboriaSe leesee to deduct the 
coatf-of euoh insurance for each piece of Leased Equipment oovvrmd hereby 
from a>V eoniaa duo Urd owing by Lssaea to La Igor* 
TRANSPORTATION, INC. 
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1% CARE. 0U3TCDY AH3 CONTROL OF EOU^PHBHT.As provided i n Seo t i en 3 
abort, i t i s understood and acknowledged by both partite that tha exclusive 
care, custody ani oontrol of the Leased Equipaent shall be in Lasses for 
tha tara of thil Agreeaent* Any other provision of this Agreeaent not-
withstanding, i t is further understood and acknowledged that Lessor cannot 
laase tha Leased Eqtdpnnt to any other parson or perfora actor trans-
portation eerviea for any other person without the prior consent of Lasses* 
If Lesser shall, without Lessee** prior oonsent* lease the Leased Equipaent 
to to any other person or perform transportation sarTioes tharwith, Lesser 
shall pay to Laseee the sua of One Hundred Dollars ($100*00) par each such 
occurance as liquidated dasages far breach of this prevision* Nothing in 
this Section shell be construed. however, as superceding or Modify any of 
Lessor's other obligations or Lasses'i other rssediss under this Agreeaent. 
(a) I t i s understood ani acknowledged by both parties that upon 
violation of this provision in the Agreewnt can by iaaadiate cause for 
termination of Leaaa Agree sent* 
(b) I f Ussar i s asked, either by Dispatch or other authority with 
Lessee, for help vith loading and Lessor i s able to procure & load* Lasses 
HOST have particular load approved thru Dispatch before eoaaiting to or 
loading said load* All Loads MUST BS APPROVED, booked and hi Had thru the 
Salt Laka office, HO EXCEPTIONS Lessee sgrses to work on a flat ioj for all 
loads that are procured thru Lessor's own effort*, providing that Lessor 
handles a l l of his own advancing of aoney acd Trip-Leasing* B B ft B TRANS-
PORTATION, INO* under no eireuiatancas, v i l l advanoe aoney on BOM one elsss 
freight. 
12. CHECK - IH DNDER DISPATCHt There v i l l by a HAJCATORI call-check in 
before 10t00 AH Mountain TIDB each Honiay thru Friday vhile Lsssar i s under 
a dispatch.rims VILL bs levied at tha rate of $50.CO per each violation 
of this provision at Use of settlenanfe per each individual load that call 
vaa net sade* 
RANapORTATION, INC. 
13. ADVAMSIK3 OH LQAD3 (FAgTRACK3)t Lasses is set up oa an sdraming 
eystea oalled Fastrack. This allows ua to gits Lessor a series of nuabers 
(15 digits) vcrth up to 11,000.00* Then is a charge that v iU be absorbed 
by the Lessor of $3*50 per transaction* AH advances MUST be taken during 
ncsraeJ. business hours (8too AM to JStoo PH, Hon-lri)* There are J4Q adraneing 
Carte taken out of the offiee after hours * We hare had a problaa in the 
Past with loaing ferae that hare been taken out so there will be abeolutly 
no advancing ea weekends or lata at night. 
14. DISPATCH (LOAD) WIHBER3 OH PAPSKVCnKt All bills Of lading, straight 
b i l l a , photo-oopys, aigned delivery receipts, or freight bil ls turned in 
far billing purposes or payment to the B B4 B Transportation office HUSI 
Have either a dispatch or Pro nuaber that i s girea to Lessor at t i n of 
loading, jrosantently narked and circled on each bil l of lading pertaining 
to that particular load« If paperwork i s turned in without a Dispatch 
Kuaber, there v i l l be a deduction of $30.00 per neb* h i l l of lading that 
ia net ao narked. 
15. PHYSICAL pAHACE TO SQUIFHBHT. Lessee shall have no reiponaibility 
vhataoarer for loss or daaage to the Leased Equipment during the t a n of toil 
^graeaont ani Lessor hereby, for itself , i t s successors and a3ri.gr* and i ts 
insurers, as the oaae nay be, waivee any claias i t say bate against the 
Its see for such daaage or destruction* 
16* TAXED AM UHTrcRH CAB CARDS. Lssses shall furnish to Lesaer, at 
ood-t, JD" Unifort Cab cards (NAflUC) and v i l l handle payaent ( to be de-
ducted froa aettleasnt} of fuel taxes for cost of expenses thereof) the 
handling, of all other taxes including but not United to, highway us* 
taxes and gross ton mileage taxes, shall be the sole responsibility of the 
***/Scs"« 
17* CIlAnQg-BACK ITSH3 • It is understood and acknowledged that upon the 
t«r-mi nation or cancellation of this agreement the Lessor shall return to 
Laaaee any "D" UnLfori Cab Cards (HARUO) furniBhed far operations hereunder 
a^d also shall return any and al l signs, placards, or aarkingi, lioense 
P^&tee, all licensing cards, fuel permits, hasardous t r a i t s , and anything 
eiae furnished by B B k B Transportation at the tiae of Lease, I f said itaas 
«r-a not returned within ten (10) days following the date of sueh termination 
cr- cancellation, Leasee may deduct such costs froa any rental payaents 
4154 SOUTH 300 EA91 
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wining due and payable to the Lessor* Leasee Bay alao ohargo back to 
i Lessor all costs paid for fuel taxes ted aaid charge back shall be 
Id by deduction fro a rental payment a due to the Leaser* 
18. RESPONSIBILITY FCR COSTS, Unleaa expressly provided to the eon-
117 elsewhere herein, the Lessor shall be responsible far and shall pay 
» cost of al l fuels 1 lubricating oila* repairs• fuel taxes* eapty vilsage 
raits of a l l Hnda and types (except operating authorities granted by the 
3 or State Regulatory Age nolo a) to l l s , ferries» base plates and other veb-
1* licenses. 
19* PURCHASES fllOH LESSEE The Lessor i s not required to purchase cp 
it any products• equipoent or servioet froa Lessee aa a condition for 
ntering into the Agree rant* 
20* TERM AH3 HOTICB. This Agreonent shall cantinue for a perihd of 
Lrty one (31) days froa the date specified in Section 1 above and there-
ber until cancelled upon thirty (30) daya written notiee by either party* 
the event notice i s to be given pursuant to any provision bf this Agree* 
tit i f to Lessee, i t shall be sent, by oertified sail , postage pre-paid, 
telegrai toi
 B B ft B TRANSKRrATI0H IKC, 
PO Box 7061 
Hurray, Ut« 64107 
1, i f Lessor 1 i t shall be Bent tor 
h/€,*A}' tA+s-L *Ut4Z flH#e f - *?*<• "™ 
Ltten notice shall be considered sufficient i f nailed postage prepaid, 
rtified or registered nail to the above respective address* Either party 
i change .such notice address at any tine by notice in writing to tba other* 
21. SUBSTITUTION OF EOUIPHEHr. In the event any vehicle leased to Lasses 
rsuant to this Agreenent shall, for any reason, fail to eoaplate operation 
destination, lessee shall have the right to forward the Lead or azy part 
ereof as nay be necessary by any weans or vehicle with the least possible 
lay, and shall deduct froa any a»ount due Lessor the cost anl expense there 
£# JW Q^ I P /^rY^tVS^V'felf P.O.BOX7W! 
IA Ilfi ftO lUft TvJrSSSSrJ <t54SOUTH300WE3T 
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22. IDENTIFICATION OF VEHICLES. Leasee shall provide all 
identification required by governmental agencies to be affixed 
-o the Leased Equipment, and Lessor will be required to have 
company name on truck and necessary decals. Lessor ahall 
promptly remove and return such identification on the termina-
tion or cancellation of this Agreement. 
23. BREACH OF CONTRACT/TERMINATION. In the event either party 
commits a naterial breach of any term of this Agreement, the other 
party shall have the right to terminate this Agreement immediately 
and hold the breaching party liable for damages occasioned by 
such breach, including Attorney fees and Court coats, 
24. COPIES IM VEHICLE. Lessor covenants, represents and 
guarantees that a signed copy of this Agreement, or atatement aa 
tuthorized by 49 C.F.R.S. 1057. 11(c) (2), ahall be carried in 
each unit of the Leased Equipment at all times this Agreement is 
in effect. 
In witness whereof, the parties have executed this Agreement 
of the day and year first above written. 
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Leasee will deduct as fair and equitable compensation froa 
each and every shipment and/or load tranaported by virtue of 
Leasee's Common Carrier Authority MC 174343 and sub-paragraphs 
thereof 15* or $50,00 which ever is greater of the gross receipts. 
All monies are due and payable according to the terms and condi-
tions of the Lease Agreement. Settlements are guaranteed due to 
Lessor not later than thirty (30)days after bills are received in 
the office and able to forward. Payroll and settlements are 
done ONCE a week, on Fridays. If Lessee is paid before the 
thirty (30) days are expired, and there ia no claim of damage or 
shortage or a claim of any kind, on the load, Lessor will be 
Lessor will be settled on the Friday closest. 
LESSEE Jfilrt/td J\ ShtiO LESSOR 
B'fri B TRANSPORTATION,INC 
IX /77*~%A Z2tt~>utJ*; 
DATE ^i& dlttftur /&^ >Cf9b DATE* J3L- /{- 7<0 
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35-1-42 LABOR — INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
writing, good and sufficient reasons for such failure. The commission may 
require the information herein required to be furnished to be made under oath 
and returned to the commission within the period fixed by it or by law. The 
commission, or any member thereof, or any person employed by the commis-
sion for that purpose, shall have the right to examine, under oath, any em-
ployer, his agents or employees, for the purpose of ascertaining any informa-
tion which such employer is required by this title to furnish to the commis-
sion. Any employer who, within a reasonable time to be fixed by the commis-
sion and after the receipt of written notice signed by at least two members of 
the commission specifying the information demanded and served by regis-
tered mail, refuses to furnish to the commission the annual statement herein 
required, or who refuses to furnish such other information as may be required 
by the commission under authority of this section, or who willfully furnishes a 
false or untrue statement shall be liable to" a penalty of not to exceed $500 for 
each offense to be recovered in a civil action brought by and in the name of the 
commission. All such penalties when collected shall be paid into the combined 
injury benefit fund. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 34; C.L. 1917, 42-1-39; L. 1939, ch. 51, § 1; C. 1943, 42-1-39; 
§ 3094; L. 1921, ch. 67, § 1; R.S. 1933, L. 1945, ch. 65, § 1; 1977, ch. 156, § 2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Determination of identity of employer. 
Foreign employer. 
Determination of identity of employer. Foreign employer. 
The determination of who is the employer, The Legislature in using the word "em-
and who owned the business, in the employ of ployer" in this section had in mind only those 
which the employee was injured, if a material employers whose employees are regularly em-
issue in the case, must be determined by the ployed, plus, perhaps, under § 35-1-54, those 
commission and on the basis of competent evi- hired here. United Airlines Transp. Corp. v. 
dence before it. Putnam v. Industrial Comm'n, Industrial Comm'n, 110 Utah 590, 175 P.2d 
80 Utah 187, 14 P.2d 973 (1932). 752 (1946). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 100 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensa- Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation 
tion § 384. «=» 1090. 
35-1-42. Employers enumerated and defined — Regularly 
employed — Statutory employers. 
(1) The state, and each county, city, town, and school district in the state 
are considered employers under this title. 
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), each person, including each public 
utility and each independent contractor, who regularly employs one or more 
workers or operatives in the same business, or in or about the same establish-
ment, under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written is consid-
ered an employer under this title. As used in this subsection: 
140 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION 35-1-42 
(a) "Regularly" includes all employments in the usual course of the 
trade, business, profession, or occupation of the employer, whether contin-
uous throughout the year or for only a portion of the year. 
(b) "Independent contractor" means any person engaged in the perfor-
mance of any work for another who, while so engaged, is independent of 
the employer in all that pertains to the execution of the work, is not 
subject to the rule or control of the employer, is engaged only in the 
performance of a definite job or piece of work, and is subordinate to the 
employer only in effecting a result in accordance with the employer's 
design. 
(3) (a) An agricultural employer is not considered an employer under this 
title if: 
(i) his employees are all members of his immediate family and he 
has a proprietary interest in the farm where they work; or 
(ii) he employed five or fewer persons other than immediate family 
members for 40 hours or more per week per employee for 13 consecu-
tive weeks during any part of the preceding 12 months, 
(b) A domestic employer who does not employ one employee or more 
than one employee at least 40 hours per week is not considered an em-
ployer under this title. 
(4) An employer of agricultural laborers or domestic servants who is not 
under this title has the right and option to come under it by complying with 
its provisions and the rules of the commission. 
(5) (a) If any person who is an employer procures any work to be done 
wholly or in part for him by a contractor over whose work he retains 
supervision or control, and this work is a part or process in the trade or 
business of the employer, the contractor, all persons employed by him, all 
subcontractors under him, and all persons employed by any of these sub-
contractors, are considered employees of the original employer. 
(b) A general contractor may not be considered to have retained super-
vision or control over the work of a subcontractor solely because of the 
customary trade relationship between general contractors and subcon-
tractors. 
(c) A portion of a construction project subcontracted to others may be 
considered to be a part or process in the trade or business of the general 
building contractor, only if the general building contractor, without re-
gard to whether or not it would need additional employees, would perform 
the work in the normal course of its trade or business. 
(d) Any person who is engaged in constructing, improving, repairing, 
or remodelling a residence that he owns or is in the process of acquiring 
as his personal residence may not be considered an employee or employer 
solely by operation of Subsection (a). 
(e) A partner in a partnership or an owner of a sole proprietorship may 
not be considered an employee under Subsection (a) if: 
(i) the person is not included as an employee under Subsection 
35-1-43 (3) (a); or 
(ii) the person is included as an employee under Subsection 
35-1-43 (3) (a), but his employer fails to insure or otherwise provide 
adequate payment of direct compensation, which failure is attribut-
able to an act or omission over which the person had or shared control 
or responsibility. 
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(f) For purposes of Subsection (e) (ii): 
(i) a partner of a partnership and an owner of a sole proprietorship 
are presumed to have had or shared control or responsibility for any 
failure to insure or otherwise provide adequate payment of direct 
compensation, the burden of proof being on any person seeking to 
establish the contrary; and 
(ii) evidence affirmatively establishing that a partner of a partner-
ship or an owner of a sole proprietorship had or shared control or 
responsibility for any failure to insure or otherwise provide adequate 
payment of direct compensation may only be overcome by clear and 
convincing evidence to the contrary. 
(g) A director or officer of a corporation may not be considered an em-
ployee under Subsection (a) if the director or officer is excluded from 
coverage under Subsection 35-1-43 (3) (b). 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 50; C.L. 1917, 
§ 3110; L. 1919, ch. 63, § 1; R.S. 1933, 
42-1-40; L. 1939, ch. 51, § 1; C. 1943, 42-1-40; 
L. 1949, ch. 52, § 1; 1975, ch. 101, § 1; 1983, 
ch. 355, § 1; 1986, ch. 211, § 3; 1988, ch. 109, 
§ 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amend-
ment, effective July 1, 1986, deleted "shall" in 
the introductory language and made a stylistic 
change in Subsection (1); redesignated the in-
troductory language of Subsection (2) as Sub-
section (2)(a), deleted "private" before "corpo-
ration" and made stylistic changes in Subsec-
tion (2)(a); subdivided the section following 
"except" into Subsections (2)(a)(i) and (2)(a)(ii); 
redesignated Subsections (2)(a) and (2)(b) as 
(2)(a)(i)(A) and (2)(a)(i)(B), redesignated the 
second sentence as Subsection (2)(b;; desig-
nated the third sentence as Subsections (3) and 
(3)(a); designated the fourth sentence as Sub-
section (3) and (3)(a); designated the fourth 
sentence as Subsection (3)(b); designated the 
fifth sentence as Subsection (3)(c); designated 
the sixth sentence as Subsection (3)(d); deleted 
"who meet any one of the following conditions" 
following "employers" in Subsection (2)(a)(i); 
deleted "provided that" before "the inclusion" 
and made minor word changes in Subsections 
(2)(a)(i)(A) and (2)(a)(i)(B); substituted a period 
for "provided that employers" following "week" 
in Subsection (2)(a)(ii); deleted "and regula-
tions" following "rules" and made stylistic 
changes in Subsection (2)(b); substituted "As 
used in this section" for "The term 'regularly' 
as herein used shall include" at the beginning 
of Subsection (3); inserted "'Regularly' in-
cludes" at the beginning of Subsection (3)(a); 
substituted "are considered" for "shall be 
deemed, within the meaning of this section" 
and made minor word changes in Subsection 
(3)(b); and made stylistic changes in Subsec-
tions (3)(c) and (3)(d). 
The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 
1988, deleted the introductory language, which 
read 'The following constitute employers sub-
ject to the provisions of this title"; added "are 
considered employers under this title" at the 
end of Subsection (1); redesignated the former 
introductory paragraph of Subsection (2)(a) as 
the present introductory paragraph of Subsec-
tion (2) and, in that paragraph, added the sec-
ond sentence and rewrote the first sentence; 
redesignated former Subsections (3)(a) and 
(3)(d) as present Subsections (2)(a) and (2)(b); 
deleted "association, or corporation" following 
"person" in Subsection (2)(b); restructured for-
mer Subsection (2)(a)(i) as present Subsection 
(3)(a), rewriting the contents thereof; redesig-
nated former Subsection (2)(a)(ii) as present 
Subsection (3)(b), rewriting the contents 
thereof, which read "domestic employers who 
do not employ one employee or more than one 
employee at least 40 hours per week"; redesig-
nated former Subsection (2)(b) as present Sub-
section (4), rewriting the contents thereof, 
which read "Employers of agricultural laborers 
and domestic servants have the right to come 
under the terms of this title by complying with 
the provisions of this title and the rules of the 
commission"; deleted the former introductory 
language of former Subsection (3), which read 
"As used in this section"; redesignated former 
Subsection (3)(b) as present Subsection (5)(a), 
substituting therein "If any person who is an" 
for "Where any"; deleted former Subsection 
(3)(c), which read "Any person, firm, or corpo-
ration engaged in the performance of work as 
an independent contractor is considered an em-
ployer"; and added Subsections (5)(b) through 
(5)(g). 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Agricultural laborers and domestic servants. 
Bringing excepted employees under act. 
Construction and application. 
Contractor employees. 
Contractor or subcontractor as employer. 
"Definite job" test. 
Determination of nature of business. 








Operation and effect. 
Question on appeal. 
Regular employment. 
Relationship of employer and employee. 




Subcontractor an employee. 
—Employee of subcontractor. 
Subcontractor's employee. 
Supervision. 
Tests and determinative factors. 
Cited. 
Agricultural laborers and domestic ser-
vants. 
One employed by co-operative owners of 
threshing machine to thresh crop was an "agri-
cultural laborer" within Workmen's Compen-
sation Act. Jones v. Industrial Comm'n, 55 
Utah 489, 187 P. 833 (1920). 
Sheepherder is included within term "agri-
cultural laborers" as used in this section and, 
hence, not entitled to compensation for inju-
ries. Davis v. Industrial Comm'n, 59 Utah 607, 
206 P. 267 (1922). 
Where employer conducts both industrial 
and agricultural enterprises, death of em-
ployee while engaged in latter work is not com-
pensable notwithstanding he might have done 
industrial work after farm work was com-
pleted, and notwithstanding employer used 
farm produce to feed animals employed in its 
industrial enterprise. Ocean Accident & Guar-
antee Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 69 Utah 473, 
256 P. 405 (1926). 
Farm laborers and domestic servants, hav-
ing been excepted from the provisions of the 
act (§ 35-1-1 et seq.), are left in the same situa-
tion they would have been in had the act not 
been passed. Murray v. Strike, 76 Utah 118, 
287 P. 922 (1930). 
A housekeeper is to be classed as a "domestic 
servant" within the meaning of that term as 
used in this section, but those and other ex-
cepted employees may be brought within the 
act by compliance on part of employer with re-
quirements of its provisions. Murray v. Strike, 
76 Utah 118, 287 P. 922 (1930). 
Employee injured by falling off hay to be 
used to feed horses in connection with opera-
tion of brick plant is doing work incidental to 
his employment with brick plant and not in 
agricultural occupation. Harding v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 83 Utah 376, 28 P.2d 182, 91 A.L.R. 
1523 (1934). 
Bringing excepted employees under act. 
The statute requires an employer of excepted 
employees to meet the following requirements 
in order to bring himself and such employees 
within provisions of act: (1) Secure insurance 
and keep insured as required by § 35-1-46; (2) 
file notice of his insurance together with copy 
of the policy with the Industrial Commission as 
required by § 35-1-47; and (3) post typewritten 
or printed notices on or about the premises 
showing that he has complied with the law, as 
required by § 35-1-56. This option is not ex-
tended to the employee, but if employer exer-
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cises his option then employee thereby loses 
the right to pursue his common-law remedies. 
Murray v. Strike, 76 Utah 118, 287 P. 922 
(1930). 
A housekeeper is to be classed as a "domestic 
servant." But excepted employees may be 
brought within the act (§ 35-1-1 et seq.) by 
compliance with its provisions. Murray v. 
Strike, 76 Utah 118, 287 P. 922 (1930). 
Construction and application. 
The definitions in this section control in so 
far as they may tend to modify the common law 
of master and servant. Murray v. Wasatch 
Grading Co., 73 Utah 430, 274 P. 940 (1929). 
The term "employer" is broad enough to 
cover all employment relationships. Ortega v. 
Salt Lake Wet Wash Laundry, 108 Utah 1,156 
P.2d 885 (1945). 
Subsection (5)(a) should be construed in fa-
vor of protecting the employee. Bennett v. In-
dustrial Comm'n, 726 P.2d 427 (Utah 1986). 
Contractor employees. 
The cleaning of oil storage tanks was a part 
or process in the business of an oil refining 
company, and the company was the employer 
of a contractor's employee's engaged to clean 
the tanks. Lee v. Chevron Oil Co., 565 P.2d 
1128 (Utah 1977). 
Contractor or subcontractor as employer. 
Where contractor who was not subject to this 
act prior to 1949 amendment inasmuch as he 
never employed more than two men, and who 
was under primary obligation to county to 
paint roof of courthouse and jail, contracted 
with subcontractor, who was subject to act be-
cause he employed as many as twenty men, 
that latter furnish labor and equipment for job 
and contractor would furnish paint therefor; 
but, as subcontractor was unable to finish job 
because of other work, contractor sent his two 
employees to do so pursuant to understanding 
between contractor and subcontractor that lat-
ter would pay former's men therefor, and one of 
them while working thereon was fatally in-
jured whereupon subcontractor paid contractor 
for his time and thereafter completed job, in-
jured employee at time of accident was em-
ployee of the subcontractor within meaning of 
this act. Rosenbaum v. Industrial Comm'n, 112 
Utah 109, 185 P.2d 511 (1947). 
"Definite job" test 
The "definite job" test is not helpful unless it 
is taken in connection with other factors or 
limited to jobs such as are usually done by out-
side parties in pursuance of their independent 
callings, such as construction of buildings or 
some job not in the line of the employer's busi-
ness, but something which he finds necessary 
or desirable in the furtherance of his business. 
Parkinson v. Industrial Comm'n, 110 Utah 
309, 172 P.2d 136 (1946). 
Determination of nature of business. 
General business of employer is controlling 
factor in determining nature of employment 
and right to compensation; where carpenter's 
helper, employed by ranch company to build 
house on ranch for manager, was injured while 
assisting in carrying groceries into house pur-
suant to request, he was not entitled to com-
pensation, since ranch company was engaged 
in industrial labor and was not also engaged in 
the construction business; such construction 
was merely incidental to its farming business. 
Anderson v. Last Chance Ranch Co., 63 Utah 
551, 228 P. 184 (1924). 
Employee and independent contractor. 
Agent can be "employee" for limited purpose 
and "independent contractor" for other pur-
poses. Christean v. Industrial Comm'n, 113 
Utah 451, 196 P.2d 502 (1948). 
Subcontractor, who was both owner and em-
ployee of his business, was considered em-
ployee of general contractor for workers' com-
pensation purposes where metal work done by 
subcontractor was part of process in general 
contractor's business, and where general con-
tractor had substantial right, under the ar-
rangement, to control the subcontractor's 
work. Pinter Constr. Co. v. Frisby, 678 P.2d 
305 (Utah 1984). 
Express company. 
Express company is not common carrier by 
railroad within Federal Employers' Liability 
Act, but comes within Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act. State ex rel. Bennett v. American Ex-
press Co., 57 Utah 405, 195 P. 312 (1921). 
Firm. 
The term "firm" as used in this section in-
cludes a partnership. Berger v. Minnesota 
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 723 P.2d 388 (Utah 
1986)(decided prior to 1988 amendment). 
Foreign corporation. 
Stipulation that employer had three or more 
employees on date of injury, and that it had not 
procured workmen's compensation insurance 
to cover its Utah employees, was sufficient to 
support finding that employer was subject to 
provisions of Utah act, where employer was a 
foreign corporation licensed to do business in 
Utah. Buckingham Transp. Co. v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 93 Utah 342, 72 P.2d 1077 (1937). 
Independent contractor. 
An independent contractor is one who exer-
cises independent employment, and contracts 
to do piece of work by his own methods without 
being subject to employer's control except as to 
result of work. Strieker v. Industrial Comm'n, 
55 Utah 603,188 P. 849,19 A.L.R. 1159 (1920). 
Where deceased, who was hired as quarry 
worker to drill, load and shoot holes, acted on 
own judgment as to manner of prosecuting 
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work, was free from any control from employer 
and assumed all risks of accident, he was an 
independent contractor within meaning of 
Compensation Act (§ 35-1-1 et seq.). Strieker 
v. Industrial Comm'n, 55 Utah 603,188 P. 849, 
19 A.L.R. 1159 (1920). 
An independent contractor is one who is un-
der contract to render service or do work for 
another according to his own method, means, 
and manner of doing the work and without be-
ing subject to the control, direction, or supervi-
sion of such other, except as to the result of the 
work or service. Strieker v. Industrial Comm'n, 
55 Utah 603,188 P. 849,19 A.L.R. 1159 (1920). 
Claimant who contracted to pour cement for 
construction of apartment building charging 
certain amount per cubic foot and who hired 
his own help, was an independent contractor 
and not an employee. Angel v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 64 Utah 105, 228 P. 509 (1924). 
In proceeding for compensation for death of 
driver of automobile truck transporting chil-
dren to school, where employer of driver was 
independent contractor, deceased was not enti-
tled to compensation. Ludlow v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 65 Utah 168, 235 P. 884 (1925). 
Under this section, men hiring out them-
selves together with their teams to a road con-
tractor, and who worked as laborers and team-
sters under supervision of superintendent, and 
who were paid in yardage, were employees and 
not independent contractors. Columbia Cas. 
Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 74 Utah 597, 281 P. 
198 (1929). 
Partnership engaged in hauling gravel made 
agreement with partnership engaged in build-
ing contracting whereby former was to dig 
foundation of building for specific sum and 
haul gravel at specified price per load; partners 
engaged in hauling gravel were independent 
contractors so partnership engaged in building 
contracting was not employer and not liable for 
death of partner while hauling gravel under 
Workmen's Compensation Act. Gibson v. In-
dustrial Comm'n, 81 Utah 580, 21 P.2d 536 
(1933). 
Where truck driver was killed while deliver-
ing gravel from gravel company's pit to site 
where hospital was being constructed, and 
gravel company had refused to contract with 
truck owner but permitted him to put his truck 
into service at agreed rate of compensation, 
and such owner employed driver, driver was 
not employee of gravel company but was inde-
pendent contractor. Luker Sand & Gravel Co. 
v. Industrial Comm'n, 82 Utah 188, 23 P.2d 
225 (1933). 
Where subcontractor was an independent 
contractor, contractor was not liable to pay 
compensation to subcontractor's employee; al-
though contract between contractor and sub-
contractor provided that work was to be done 
as directed by contractor, subcontractor was to 
furnish bond to protect contractor from com-
pensation claims, and contractor had right to 
object to workmen employed by subcontractor. 
Murch Bros. Constr. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 
84 Utah 494, 36 P.2d 1053 (1934). 
Evidence that employer retained control and 
supervision over truck drivers furnished along 
with trucks by independent contractor under 
oral contract in which contractor agreed to 
make all deliveries for employer, sustained 
award of compensation for driver injured in 
course of his employment as an employee of 
employer within meaning of this section. Utah 
Fire Clay Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 86 Utah 1, 
40 P.2d 183 (1935). 
Bedding company salesman who received no 
instruction as to place, time or manner of 
work, furnished own means of transportation, 
paid own expenses, was not subject to com-
pany's control over movements or mode of do-
ing work, and was given an allowance based on 
amount of sales by way of compensation for his 
services, was an independent contractor and 
not an employee of company, and his death was 
not compensable. Stover Bedding Co. v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 99 Utah 423,107 P.2d 1027,134 
A.L.R. 1006 (1940). 
Driver of loaded gravel truck was an inde-
pendent contractor. Kinder v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 106 Utah 448, 150 P.2d 109 (1944). 
Although obtaining coke was a necessary 
condition for carrying on employer's business, 
yet where such employer was not in trucking 
business, nor in business of selling coke, the 
hauling of coke was not "a part or process in 
the trade or business of the employer" within 
the meaning of this section, and trucker's rela-
tionship was held that of independent contrac-
tor and not employer-employee. Parkinson v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 110 Utah 309, 172 P.2d 
136 (1946). 
Licensed plumber who orally contracted with 
contractor, who was engaged in building apart-
ment house for himself, to lay pipe in trench 
for $1.00 per foot for purpose of connecting 
with city sewer, pursuant to city requirement 
that a licensed plumber do pipe laying, was 
properly found by Industrial Commission to be 
independent contractor and not employee so as 
to preclude compensation for plumber's death 
while laying pipe as result of cave-in; where 
contractor did not exercise or intend to exercise 
any supervisory control over plumber and did 
not carry him on payroll as employee, and 
plumber employed and paid his assistants and 
furnished necessary tools and equipment, even 
though plumber did not maintain regular 
plumbing shop, and notwithstanding that he 
voluntarily aided in backfilling and pipe 
blinding. Ewer v. Industrial Comm'n, 112 
Utah 538, 189 P.2d 959 (1948). 
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While present social concepts may dictate 
that commission salesmen should be consid-
ered employees rather than independent con-
tractors so as to be covered by Workmen's 
Compensation Act; in view of development of 
Utah law and numerous decisions of Supreme 
Court over period of years, it is for Legislature, 
rather than court, to accomplish such change. 
Christean v. Industrial Comm'n, 113 Utah 451, 
196 P.2d 502 (1948). 
Insurance salesman was properly found by 
industrial commission to have been "indepen-
dent contractor," and not "employee," when 
killed as result of collision while en route in his 
car for purpose of soliciting insurance, so as to 
preclude compensation, where contract be-
tween salesman and insurance company pro-
vided that relationship should be that of inde-
pendent contractor, and control that company 
could exercise thereunder consisted in limiting 
salesman's right to bind company contractu-
ally and of right to control results of his work, 
and did not go to extent of directing how work 
should be done, even though he was receiving a 
salary incident to a refresher course after re-
turn from military service. Christean v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 113 Utah 451, 196 P.2d 502 
(1948). 
Where owner of building engaged plaintiff 
and another to make repairs thereto and, while 
owner was charged union scale of wages for 
carpenters and furnished materials, owner 
merely showed them what work she wanted 
done and left it entirely up to them as to 
method or manner of accomplishing desired re-
sult, and plaintiff and other person determined 
what materials should be used and what quan-
tity would be necessary, and furnished their 
own tools, preponderance of evidence estab-
lished absence of right of control on part of 
owner, and therefore, plaintiff was "indepen-
dent contractor," and not" employee," and pre-
cluded from compensation for injuries sus-
tained while doing repair work on building. 
Sommerville v. Industrial Comm'n, 113 Utah 
504, 196 P.2d 718 (1948). 
There was sufficient evidence to sustain 
commission's finding that a construction com-
pany retained supervision and control over 
work done by shinglers and was thus the em-
ployer of a person employed by the shinglers 
within the meaning of this section. Plewe 
Constr. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 121 Utah 
375, 242 P.2d 561 (1952). 
There was sufficient evidence to support 
finding that plaintiff was an employee for 
workmen's compensation purposes where it 
was shown that the claimant was hired by the 
company to provide and operate a drilling rig 
and crew for drilling and sampling soil and 
where, although company did not carry him on 
their books nor withhold income tax or social 
security, the company kept a supervisor on the 
job who was there 95% of the time and exer-
cised close supervision. Maryland Cas. Co. v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 12 Utah 2d 223, 364 P.2d 
1020 (1961). 
Where workers' compensation claimant was 
injured while installing roof for general con-
tractor, it was not arbitrary or capricious to 
deny benefits on the ground that claimant was 
a self-employed contractor, even though gen-
eral contractor furnished materials and di-
rected claimant to some extent with regard to 
the manner of installation. Graham v. R. 
Thorne Found., 675 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1983). 
Subcontractor, who was both owner and em-
ployee of his business, was considered em-
ployee of general contractor for workers' com-
pensation purposes where metal work done by 
subcontractor was part of process in general 
contractor's business, and where general con-
tractor had substantial right, under the ar-
rangement, to control the subcontractor's 
work. Pinter Constr. Co. v. Frisby, 678 P.2d 
305 (Utah 1984). 
Judicial review. 
Question, prior to 1949 amendment, whether 
there were more than two employees in service 
of employer when injury occurred presented 
question of jurisdiction as to which it became 
duty of Supreme Court to judicially review and 
determine facts as well as law. Hardman v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 60 Utah 203, 207 P. 460 
(1922). 
Under this section, prior to 1949 amend-
ment, "the evidence must be sufficient to rea-
sonably justify a finding that the employer at 
the time of the accident had in his 'service 
three or more workmen or operatives regularly 
employed in the same business, or in or about 
the same establishment."' Buhler v. Maddison, 
105 Utah 39, 140 P.2d 933 (1943). 
Jurisdiction. 
Industrial Commission having arrived at 
conclusion, prior to 1949 amendment, that 
there were only two employees engaged in ser-
vice of employer at time injury occurred, com-
mission was not justified in proceeding further 
than to deny application for want of jurisdic-
tion. Hardman v. Industrial Comm'n, 60 Utah 
203, 207 P. 460 (1922). 
Jurisdictional question. 
Whether or not one engaged in service for 
another is an employee or an independent con-
tractor is a jurisdictional question presenting a 
situation which requires Supreme Court to de-
termine status from facts submitted, from a 
preponderance of the evidence, and apply the 
facts so found to the law of the case. Luker 
Sand & Gravel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 82 
Utah 188, 23 P.2d 225 (1983); Parkinson v. In-
dustrial Comm'n, 110 Utah 309, 172 P.2d 136 
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(1946); Sommerville v. Industrial Comm'n, 113 
Utah 504, 196 P.2d 718 (1948). 
Question being jurisdictional, Supreme 
Court on appeal is required to examine evi-
dence to determine whether it preponderates 
against conclusions of industrial commission. 
Christean v. Industrial Comm'n, 113 Utah 451, 
196 P.2d 502 (1948). 
Operation and effect 
This section, prior to 1949 amendment, di-
vided employers into two classes—those upon 
whom the provisions of the act were manda-
tory, and those upon whom the provisions of 
the act were optional. The optional group in-
cluded employers of agricultural and domestic 
laborers and employers having less than three 
persons regularly employed. The mandatory 
group included the state and each county, city, 
town and school district therein, and every per-
son, firm, or corporation having in service 
three or more employees regularly employed, 
except the optional groups. Ortega v. Salt Lake 
Wet Wash Laundry, 108 Utah 1, 156 P.2d 885 
(1945). 
Question on appeal. 
Where evidence is largely uncontradicted, 
problem on appeal in determining whether one 
was "employee" or "independent contractor" is 
not so much one of examining record to deter-
mine whether evidence preponderates for or 
against conclusion of commission, but rather of 
determining whether commission drew correct 
legal conclusion therefrom. Sommerville v. In-
dustrial Comm'n, 113 Utah 504, 196 P.2d 718 
(1948). 
Regular employment 
The term "regularly" connotes usually, sys-
tematically, methodically. It is not synony-
mous with "continuous" or "continuously" or 
"occasionally." Palle v. Industrial Comm'n, 79 
Utah 47, 7 P.2d 284, 81 A.L.R. 1222 (1932). 
The employment of one to take the place of a 
regular employee while absent may not be said 
to constitute a mere "casual" employment, but 
is a regular employment in the business. Palle 
v. Industrial Comm'n, 79 Utah 47, 7 P.2d 284, 
81 A.L.R. 1222 (1932). 
The word "regularly" in this section was in-
tended to include all employments, regular, ca-
sual, or occasional, in the usual trade or busi-
ness of the employer. In other words, to bring 
the employer within the act, the number of 
men employed was to be determined by the 
character of the work in which they were em-
ployed, however brief or long, and not by the 
character of the employment, whether regular, 
casual, occasional, periodical or otherwise, so 
long as they were hired and engaged to do 
work in the common or usual business of the 
employer. Palle v. Industrial Comm'n, 79 Utah 
47, 7 P.2d 284, 81 A.L.R. 1222 (1932). 
Relationship of employer and employee. 
Relationship of employer and employee may 
be established by agreement. Burke v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 75 Utah 441, 286 P. 623 (1929). 
Test of employment relationship is whether 
employer retains supervision and control of 
work to be performed, and this rule is not lim-
ited in its application to cases involving dis-
tinction between employee and independent 
contractor. Weber County-Ogden City Relief 
Comm. v. Industrial Comm'n, 93 Utah 85, 71 
P.2d 177 (1937). 
A person employed under written contract to 
set up a set of books, but who was not required 
to do any of the work at the plant, nor be there 
at any time or at all, was not an employee. "It 
was a contract for an independent piece of 
work, free from control of the company." When 
the set of books was set up, that was the end of 
the matter. Overman v. Industrial Comm'n, 
103 Utah 468, 136 P.2d 945 (1943). 
Fundamental test of employer-employee re-
lationship is right of control. Auerbach Co. v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 113 Utah 347, 195 P.2d 
245 (1948). 
Where parties in good faith contract as to 
status and such understanding is not contrary 
to law, intent of parties as set forth in such 
contract may be considered as element in de-
termining relationship of parties, and may be 
given weight by industrial commission and Su-
preme Court. Christean v. Industrial Comm'n, 
113 Utah 451, 196 P.2d 502 (1948). 
A book salesman who, at the time of the acci-
dent, was working under a written agreement 
of employment whereby he was to give his en-
tire time to sale of the company's publications, 
making sales in manner and territory indi-
cated by the company, for which he was to be 
paid commission on a weekly basis for books 
that he sold, from which social security, pay-
roll, and withholding taxes were to be de-
ducted, was an employee of the company 
within the meaning of this statute. Nicholson 
v. Industrial Comm'n, 14 Utah 2d 3, 376 P.2d 
386 (1962). 
Where "independent contractor" had no 
choice of the terms of his truck lease, drove a 
truck owned by lessor, hauled only loads that 
had been approved by his supervisor, was not 
free to refuse a load, was obliged to travel a 
certain route, and operate a certain number of 
miles per month at a specified speed, there was 
reasonable basis for conclusion of the Indus-
trial Commission that plaintiff was an em-
ployee within the meaning of the workmen's 
compensation statute. Harry L. Young & Sons, 
Inc. v. Ashton, 538 P.2d 316 (Utah 1975). 
Evidence showing that claimant was an ex-
perienced drywall installer associated with an 
independent business; that plaintiff lodge con-
tacted the business concerning installation of 
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drywall on its premises; that the business was 
not interested, but plaintiff and claimant indi-
vidually agreed that claimant would do the 
work for a specified hourly rate; that under the 
terms of the agreement claimant was to fur-
nish his own special tools and plaintiff was to 
furnish him with a ladder and protective drop 
cloth; that plaintiff employed a "handyman 
crew" to conduct maintenance and repair work 
for it; that before beginning work claimant was 
"taken over the entire job," shown what ser-
vices were to be performed, shown where to 
stack the drywall and told not to damage the 
floor; and that he was not allowed to begin 
work at his first appearance was sufficient to 
support a finding that claimant was plaintiffs 
employee, and the commission did not abuse its 
discretion in awarding compensation for inju-
ries sustained when claimant suffered a fall 
while working at the lodge. Rustler Lodge v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 562 P.2d 227 (Utah 1977). 
A truck driver who took a tractor home in 
order to service and clean it was an employee 
of the truck's owner as well as the lessee of the 
truck. Kinne v. Industrial Comm'n, 609 P.2d 
926 (Utah 1980). 
Where workers' compensation claimant was 
injured while installing roof for general con-
tractor, it was not arbitrary or capricious to 
deny benefits on the ground that claimant was 
a self-employed contractor, even though gen-
eral contractor furnished materials and di-
rected claimant to some extent with regard to 
the manner of installation. Graham v. R. 
Thorne Found., 675 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1983). 
Right of employer to come under act 
As an employer of agricultural laborers and 
domestic servants is free to come under or stay 
out of the Workmen's Compensation Act, he 
may accept as to one class of employees and not 
as to another. Murray v. Strike, 76 Utah 118, 
287 P. 922 (1930). 
School district. 
While Workmen's Compensation Act merely 
requires school districts to pay compensation 
provided for in act, and does not provide how 
funds to pay compensation shall be raised, that 
standing alone would not necessarily relieve 
school district from power or duty of paying 
compensation awarded. Woodcock v. Board of 
Educ, 55 Utah 458, 187 P. 181, 10 A.L.R. 181 
(1920). 
School district represented by board of edu-
cation was liable to schoolteacher sustaining 
personal injuries in course of her employment 
for amount awarded to her by industrial com-
mission, and such amount was payable out of 
funds raised by taxation for support and main-
tenance of schools. Woodcock v. Board of Educ, 
55 Utah 458,187 P. 181,10 A.L.R. 181 (1920). 
Statutory employer. 
—"Sufficient control." 
Where joint owners of interest in oil and gas 
leases provided for construction of a gas pro-
cessing plant located in Utah, to be operated as 
a "mutually profitable venture" for the purpose 
of extracting liquid hydrocarbons, and under 
the operating agreement the owners reserved 
the power of ultimate control over the project 
and over the operator thereof, the owners re-
tained "sufficient control" to qualify as statu-
tory employers of an employee of the operator 
pursuant to Subsection (2) and the exclusive 
remedy provision of § 35-1-60 applied. Lamb v. 
W-Energy, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 395 (D. Utah 
1987). 
Subcontractor an employee. 
Subcontractor was employee of general con-
tractor within meaning of statute in light of 
evidence that general contractor had full con-
trol over subcontractor's truck and driver, that 
work done by subcontractor and truck was the 
work being performed by general contractor; 
that general contractor paid subcontractor by 
the hour for use of truck and the driver, and 
that general contractor directed and super-
vised subcontractor in hauling and dumping 
dirt for general contactor. Result was not af-
fected by fact that general contractor did not 
list driver of truck on its payroll and made no 
deductions from truck rental for Social Secu-
rity, income taxes or union dues and did not 
issue W-2 payroll form to driver of truck at the 
end of year; since subcontractor was employee 
of contractor, other employee of contractor who 
was negligently injured by subcontractor could 
not maintain tort action against subcontractor. 
Gallegos v. Stringham, 21 Utah 2d 139, 442 
P.2d 31 (1968). 
Subcontractor, who was both owner and em-
ployee of his business, was considered em-
ployee of general contractor for workers' com-
pensation purposes where metal work done by 
subcontractor was part of process in general 
contractor's business, and where general con-
tractor had substantial right, under the ar-
rangement, to control the subcontractor's 
work. Pinter Constr. Co. v. Frisby, 678 P.2d 
305 (Utah 1984). 
As long as a subcontractor's work is a part or 
process of the general contractor's business, an 
inference arises that the general contractor 
has retained supervision or control over the 
subcontractor sufficient to meet the require-
ment of this section. Bennett v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 726 P.2d 427 (Utah 1986). 
Claimant, who had been terminated by a 
construction company, was nonetheless an em-
ployee in regard to a remodeling job he subse-
quently undertook, where, although he had 
opened a "company" bank account with the in-
tention of becoming an independent contractor, 
148 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION 35-1-42 
his relationship with his former employer had 
not changed, except for the fact that payroll 
deductions were not made for him. Bennett v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 726 P.2d 427 (Utah 1986). 
—Employee of subcontractor. 
General contractor was the statutory em-
ployer of an injured carpenter's helper em-
ployed by a subcontractor, where the general 
contractor's trade or business was the total 
project — the construction of a residential ad-
dition — and carpentry work was integral to 
the project, which could not have been com-
pleted without carpenters. Jacobsen v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 738 P.2d 658 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). 
Subcontractor's employee. 
Masonry work was a part or process of the 
trade or business of the building contractor, 
thus making masonry subcontractor's em-
ployee an employee of the general contractor 
under this section. Smith v. Alfred Brown Co., 
27 Utah 2d 155, 493 P.2d 994 (1972). 
Supervision. 
When employer retains supervision and con-
trol of the work to be performed, the workmen 
under him are employees. Luker Sand & 
Gravel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 82 Utah 188, 
23 P.2d 225 (1933). 
Tests and determinative factors. 
Whether person is independent contractor or 
employee must be determined from contract it-
self, and actual interference with work is un-
necessary, since it is the right to interfere that 
determines relationship. Ludlow v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 65 Utah 168, 235 P. 884 (1925). 
Another or additional test approved by Su-
preme Court is that one is an independent con-
tractor when he can employ others to do the 
work and accomplish the contemplated result 
without the consent of the contractee. Gogoff v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 77 Utah 355, 296 P. 229 
(1931). 
Test whether employer retains supervision 
over work of contractor so as to make contrac-
tor and his employees under this section em-
ployees of employer is whether employer has 
right of supervision whether he exercises such 
right or not. Utah Fire Clay Co. v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 86 Utah 1, 40 P.2d 183 (1935). 
C.J.S. — 99 CJ.S. Workmen's Compensa-
tion §§ 37 to 58. 
A.L.R. — Right to maintain direct action 
against fellow employee for injury or death 
While it is true that manner and basis of 
payment of compensation is one element to be 
considered in determining whether claimant is 
employee or independent contractor, it is by no 
means conclusive. Stover Bedding Co. v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 99 Utah 423,107 P.2d 1027,134 
A.L.R. 1006 (1940). 
Whether a workman is an "employee" or an 
"independent contractor" is dependent on (1) 
whether the employer has the right to control 
his execution of the work, (2) whether the work 
done or to be done is a part or process in the 
trade or business of the employer, and (3) 
whether the work done or to be done is a defi-
nite job or piece of work. Parkinson v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 110 Utah 309, 172 P.2d 136 
(1946); Ewer v. Industrial Comm'n, 112 Utah 
538, 189 P.2d 959. 
The most important of the determinatives of 
the relationship between workman and em-
ployer is that of control. The existence of a po-
tential right to control is sufficient to create 
the relationship even though that right is 
never exercised. Parkinson v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 110 Utah 309, 172 P.2d 136 (1946). 
Extent of control is the important test in de-
termining status of one as "employee" or "inde-
pendent contractor," under this section. 
Christean v. Industrial Comm'n, 113 Utah 451, 
196 P.2d 502 (1948). 
"Independent calling" or "own business" test 
is not followed in Utah. Christean v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 113 Utah 451, 196 P.2d 502 (1948). 
Crucial factor in determining whether appli-
cant for workmen's compensation is "em-
ployee" or "independent contractor" is whether 
person for whom services were performed had 
right to control execution of work. Sommerville 
v. Industrial Comm'n, 113 Utah 504, 196 P.2d 
718 (1948). 
In determining who is the employer of an 
employee, the right to control the employee's 
work is dispositive of the question; the degree 
of control actually exercised need not be great, 
so long as the right exists. Bambrough v. 
Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1976). 
Cited in RDG Associates/Jorman Corp. v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 63 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 
(1987). 
covered by workmen's compensation, 21 
A.L.R.3d 845. 
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63-46b-ll. Default 
(1) The presiding officer may enter an order of default against a party if: 
(a) a party in an informal adjudicative proceeding fails to participate in 
the adjudicative proceeding; 
(b) a party to a formal adjudicative proceeding fails to attend or partici-
pate in a properly scheduled hearing after receiving proper notice; or 
(c) a respondent in a formal adjudicative proceeding fails to file a re-
sponse under Section 63-46b-6. 
(2) An order of default shall include a statement of the grounds for default 
and shall be mailed to all parties. 
(3) (a) A defaulted party may seek to have the agency set aside the default 
order, and any order in the adjudicative proceeding issued subsequent to 
the default order, by following the procedures outlined in the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
(b) A motion to set aside a default and any subsequent order shall be 
made to the presiding officer. 
(c) A defaulted party may seek agency review under Section 63-46b-12, 
or reconsideration under Section 63-46b-13, only on the decision of the 
presiding officer on the motion to set aside the default. 
(4) (a) In an adjudicative proceeding begun by the agency, or in an adjudi-
cative proceeding begun by a party that has other parties besides the 
party in default, the presiding officer shall, after issuing the order of 
default, conduct any further proceedings necessary to complete the adju-
dicative proceeding without the participation of the party in default and 
shall determine all issues in the adjudicative proceeding, including those 
affecting the defaulting party. 
(b) In an adjudicative proceeding that has no parties other than the 
agency and the party in default, the presiding officer shall, after issuing 
the order of default, dismiss the proceeding. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-ll, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 161, § 267; 1988, ch. 72, § 21. 
63-46b-12. Agency review — Procedure. 
(1) (a) If a statute or the agency's rules permit parties to any adjudicative 
proceeding to seek review of an order by the agency or by a superior 
agency, the aggrieved party may file a written request for review within 
30 days after the issuance of the order with the person OT entity desig-
nated for that purpose by the statute or rule, 
(b) The request shall: 
(i) be signed by the party seeking review; 
(ii) state the grounds for review and the relief requested; 
(iii) state the date upon which it was mailed; and 
(iv) be sent by mail to the presiding officer and to each party. 
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(2) Within 15 days" of the mailing date of the request for review, or within 
the time period provided by agency rule, whichever is longer, any party may 
file a response with the person designated by statute or rule to receive the 
response. One copy of the response shall be sent by mail to each of the parties 
and to the presiding officer. 
(3) If a statute or the agency's rules require review of an order by the 
agency or a superior agency, the agency or superior agency shall review the 
order within a reasonable time or within the time required by statute or the 
agency's rules. 
(4) To assist in review, the agency or superior agency may by order or rule 
permit the parties to file briefs or other papers, or to conduct oral argument. 
(5) Notice of hearings on review shall be mailed to all parties. 
(6) (a) Within a reasonable time after the filing of any response, other 
filings, or oral argument, or within the time required by statute or appli-
cable rules, the agency or superior agency shall issue a written order on 
review. 
(b) The order on review shall be signed by the agency head or by a 
person designated by the agency for that purpose and shall be mailed to 
each party. 
(c) The order on review shall contain: 
(i) a designation of the statute or rule permitting or requiring re-
view; 
(ii) a statement of the issues reviewed; 
(iii) findings of fact as to each of the issues reviewed; 
(iv) conclusions of law as to each of the issues reviewed; 
(v) the reasons for the disposition; 
(vi) whether the decision of the presiding officer or agency is to be 
affirmed, reversed, or modified, and whether all or any portion of the 
adjudicative proceeding is to be remanded; 
(vii) a notice of any right of further administrative reconsideration 
or judicial review available to aggrieved parties; and 
(viii) the time limits applicable to any appeal or review. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
History. C. 1953, 63-46b-12, enacted by L. 









Absent a showing of good cause for an exten-
sion, the term "filing" as used in this section 
requires, as a prerequisite to the agency's tak-
ing jurisdiction over a review, actual delivery 
of the necessary documents to the agency 
within the thirty-day time limit. Maverik 
Country Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 221 
Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Ct. App. 1993). 
Findings. 
—Sufficiency. 
When the facts in a case are undisputed, the 
failure to disclose a specific subsidiary finding 
is not fatal to the agency's decision. Zupon v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 221 Utah Adv. Rep. 37 (Ct. 
App. 1993). 
Jurisdiction. 
Appeals from agency orders subject to fur-
ther administrative review do not divest the 
agency of jurisdiction. Maverik Country 
Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 221 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 17 (Ct. App. 1993). 
Timeliness. 
Rule 6(e), U.R.C.P., which adds three days to 
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History: R.S. 1933, 42-1-97a, enacted by 
L. 1939, ch. 51, § 1; C. 1943, 42-l-97a. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 82 C J.S. Statutes § 92 et seq. 
Key Numbers. — Statutes «=» 64(2). 
35-1-107. Uninsured Employers' Fund. 
(1) There is created an Uninsured Employers' Fund. The fund has the pur-
pose of assisting in the payment of workers' compensation benefits to any 
person entitled to them, if that person's employer is individually, jointly, or 
severally liable to pay the benefits, but becomes or is insolvent, appoints or 
has appointed a receiver, or otherwise does not have sufficient funds, insur-
ance, sureties, or other security to cover workers' compensation liabilities. 
This fund succeeds to all monies previously held in the Default Indemnity 
Fund. If it becomes necessary to pay benefits, the fund is liable for all obliga-
tions of the employer as set forth in Chapters 1 and 2, Title 35, with the 
exception of penalties on those obligations. 
(2) Funds for the Uninsured Employers' Fund shall be provided under Sub-
section 59-9-101 (2). The state treasurer is the custodian of the Uninsured 
Employers' Fund and the commission shall direct its distribution. Reasonable 
costs of administration may be paid from the fund. The commission shall 
employ counsel to represent the Uninsured Employers' Fund in all proceed-
ings brought to enforce claims against or on behalf of the fund. Upon the 
request of the commission, the attorney general, city attorney, or county at-
torney of the locality in which any investigation, hearing, or trial under this 
title is pending, or in which the employee resides or an employer resides or is 
doing business, shall aid in the representation of the fond. 
(3) To the extent of the compensation and other benefits paid or payable to 
or on behalf of an employee or the employee's dependents from the Uninsured 
Employers' Fund, the fond, by subrogation, has all the rights, powers, and 
benefits of the employee or the employee's dependents against the employer 
failing to make the compensation payments. 
(4) The receiver, trustee, liquidator, or statutory successor of an insolvent 
employer is bound by settlements of covered claims by the fund. The court 
with jurisdiction shall grant all payments made under this section a priority 
equal to that to which the claimant would have been entitled in the absence of 
this section against the assets of the insolvent employer. The expenses of the 
fund in handling claims shall be accorded the same priority as the liquidator's 
expenses. 
(5) The commission shall periodically file with the receiver, trustee, or liq-
uidator of the insolvent employer or insurance carrier statements of the cov-
ered claims paid by the fund and estimates of anticipated claims against the 
fund which shall preserve the rights of the fund for claims against the assets 
of the insolvent employer. 
(6) When any injury or death for which compensation is payable from the 
Uninsured Employers' Fund has been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of 
another person not in the same employment, the fund has the same rights as 
allowed under Section 35-1-62. 
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(7) The fund, subject to approval of the Workers' Compensation Division of 
the Industrial Commission, shall discharge its obligations by adjusting its 
own claims or by contracting with an adjusting company, risk management 
company, insurance company, or other company that has expertise and capa-
bilities in adjusting and paying workers' compensation claims. 
(8) For the purpose of maintaining this fund, the commission, upon render-
ing a decision with respect to any claim for workers' compensation benefits, 
shall impose a penalty against the uninsured employer of 15% of the value of 
the total award in connection with the claim, and shall direct that the addi-
tional penalty be paid into the Uninsured Employers' Fund. Awards may be 
docketed as other awards under this chapter. 
(9) The liability of the state, the Industrial Commission, and the state trea-
surer, with respect to payment of any compensation benefits, expenses, fees, 
or disbursement properly chargeable against the fund, is limited to the assets 
in the fund, and they are not otherwise in any way liable for the making of 
any payment. 
(10) The commission may make reasonable rules for the processing and 
payment of claims for compensation from the fund. 
(11) In the event it becomes necessary for the Uninsured Employers' Fund 
to pay benefits under this section to any employee of an insolvent self-insured 
employer, the Uninsured Employers' Fund may assess all other self-insured 
employers amounts necessary to pay (a) the obligations of the fund subse-
quent to an insolvency, (b) the expenses of handling covered claims subse-
quent to an insolvency, (c) the cost of examinations under Subsection (12), and 
(d) other expenses authorized by this section. The assessments of each self-
insured employer shall be in the proportion that the manual premium of the 
self-insured employer for the preceding calendar year bears to the manual 
premium of all self-insured employers for the preceding calendar year. Each 
self-insured employer shall be notified of his assessment not later than 30 
days before it is due. No self-insured employer may be assessed in any year an 
amount greater than 2% of that self-insured employer's manual premium for 
the preceding calendar year. If the maximum assessment does not provide in 
any one year an amount sufficient to make all necessary payments from the 
fund for one or more insolvent self-insured employers, the unpaid portion 
shall be paid as soon as funds become available. All self-insured employers are 
liable under this section for a period not to exceed three years after the self-
insured employer's voluntary or involuntary termination of self-insurance 
privileges within this state. This subsection does not apply to claims made 
against an insolvent self-insured employer if the insolvency occurred prior to 
July 1, 1986. 
(12) It is the duty of all self-insured employers to notify the industrial 
commission of any information indicating that any self-insured employer may 
be insolvent or in a financial condition hazardous to its employees or the 
public. Upon receipt of that notification and with good cause appearing, the 
industrial commission may order an examination of that self-insured em-
ployer. The cost of the examination shall be assessed against all self-insured 
employers as provided in Subsection (11). The results of the examination shall 
be kept confidential. 
(13) In any claim against an employer by the Uninsured Employers' Fund, 
or by or on behalf of the employee to whom or to whose dependents compensa-
tion and other benefits are paid or payable from the fund, the burden of proof 
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is on the employer or other party in interest objecting to the claim. The claim 
is presumed to be valid up to the full amount of workers' compensation bene-
fits claimed by the employee or his dependents. This subsection applies 
whether the claim is filed in court or in an adjudicative proceeding under the 
authority of the commission. 
(14) A partner in a partnership or an owner of a sole proprietorship may not 
recover compensation or other benefits from the Uninsured Employers' Fund 
if: 
(a) the person is not included as an employee under Subsection 35-1-43 
(3) (a); or 
(b) the person is included as an employee under Subsection 35-1-43 (3) 
(a), but his employer fails to insure or otherwise provide adequate pay-
ment of direct compensation, which failure is attributable to an act or 
omission over which the person had or shared control or responsibility. 
(15) For purposes of Subsection (14) (b): 
(a) a partner of a partnership and an owner of a sole proprietorship are 
presumed to have had or shared control or responsibility for any failure to 
insure or otherwise provide adequate payment of direct compensation, the 
burden of proof being on any person seeking to establish the contrary; and 
(b) evidence affirmatively establishing that a partner of a partnership 
or an owner of a sole proprietorship had or shared control or responsibility 
for any failure to insure or otherwise provide adequate payment of direct 
compensation may only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to 
the contrary. 
(16) A director or officer of a corporation may not recover compensation or 
other benefits from the Uninsured Employers' Fund if the director or officer is 
excluded from coverage under Subsection 35-1-43 (3) (b). 
(17) Any additional administrative burden imposed by amendments to Sub-
section 35-1-42 (5) during the 1988 general session of the Legislature may be 
funded out of the Uninsured Employers' Fund, up to a maximum of $16,000. 
History: C. 1953, 35-1-107, enacted by L. 
1984, ch. 77, § 1; 1986, ch. 211, § 12; 1987, 
ch. 2, § 35; 1987, ch. 126, § 4; 1988, ch. 109, 
* 3. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amend-
ment, effective July 1, 1986, in Subsection (1) 
substituted "Uninsured Employers' Fund" for 
"Default Indemnity Fund" wherever it ap-
pears; inserted "of the claimant who is found to 
be individually, jointly, or severally liable" be-
fore "becomes" and inserted "or is" after "be-
comes" in the first sentence, inserted the sec-
ond sentence, added "with the exception of pen-
alties on those obligations" at the end of the 
last sentence, and made minor word changes; 
in Subsection (2) added "and 31A-3-20K2)" at 
the end of the first sentence, substituted "com-
mission ' for "attorney general", substituted 
employ counsel" for "appoint a member of his 
staff', added "and upon the request of the com-
missicn the attorney general, city attorney, or 
county attorney of the locality in which any 
investigation, hearing, or trial under the provi-
sions of this title is pending, or in which the 
employee resides or an employer resides or is 
doing business, shall aid in the representation 
of the fund," at the end of the fourth sentence, 
and made stylistic changes; made stylistic 
changes in Subsections (3), (4), (7), and (10); in 
the first sentence of Subsection (8) deleted 
"from the Default Indemnity Fund" following 
claim," substituted "benefits" for "compensa-
tion" following "for", inserted "uninsured" be-
fore "employer" and "value of the" before 
"total", deleted "made" following "award", in-
serted "in connection with" following "in", and 
inserted "Uninsured Employers'" before 
"Fund", and added Subsections (11) and (12). 
The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 2, effec-
tive February 6, 1987, in Subsection (2) sub-
stituted "Subsections 35-l-68(2)(a) and 59-9-
101(2)" for "Subsections 35-l-68(2)(a) and 
31A-3-201". 
The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 208, effec-
tive July 1,1987, in Subsection (2), in the first 
sentence substituted "under Subsection 
31A-3-20K2)" for "pursuant to Subsections 
35-l-68-(2)(a) and 31A-3-20K2)" 
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The section was set out in 1987 as reconciled 
by the Office of Legislative Research and Gen-
eral Counsel 
The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 
1988, in Subsection (1), divided the former first 
sentence into the present first two sentences 
and, in the second sentence, substituted T h e 
fund has the purpose of assisting m the pay-
ment of workers' compensation benefits to any 
person entitled to them, if that person's em-
ployer is individually, jointly, or severally lia-
ble to pay the benefits, but" for "for the purpose 
of paying and assuring, to persons entitled to 
workers' compensation benefits when every 
employer of the claimant who is found to be 
individually, jointly, or severally liable" and 
deleted "under this chapter" at the end; m Sub-
section (2), divided the former fourth sentence 
into the present last two sentences and deleted 
"the provisions of preceding "this title" m the 
last sentence; substituted "the employees'" for 
"their" twice in Subsection (3), "with jurisdic-
tion" for "having jurisdiction" in the second 
sentence m Subsection (4) and "workers' com-
pensation benefits" for "benefits under this 
chapter" in the first sentence of Subsection (8); 
and added Subsections (13) through (17). 
Retrospective Operation. — Laws 1987, 
ch. 2, § 331 provides: "This act has retrospec-
tive operation to January 1, 1987." 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Carlucci v. Utah State Indus. 
Comm'n & Default Indemn. Fund, 725 P.2d 
1335 (Utah 1986); Jacobsen v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 738 P.2d 658 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
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or be sued — Service of process. 
35-2-5. Commission to prescribe rules 
and regulations. 
35-2-6. Claims to be filed with commis-
sion. 
35-2-7. Commission — Powers. 
35-2-8 Depositions of witnesses 
35-2-9 Record of proceedings. 
35-2-10 Employers enumerated and de-
fined — Regularly employed — 
Independent contractors. 
35-2-11. "Employees," "workmen" and "op-
eratives" defined — Casual em-
ployment — Mining lessees and 
sublessees — Partnership mem-
bers. 
35-2-12. Construction of terms. 
35-2-13. Employer liability for compensa-
tion — Conditions when no pay-
ment to be made. 














Benefits — Amounts — Perma-
nent total disability — Voca-
tional rehabilitation — Proce-
dure and payments — Tempo-
rary total disability — Death — 
Dependents — Medical, hospi-
tal and burial expenses. 
Employers to secure compensa-
tion — Ways allowed. 
Repealed. 
State department, commission, 
board, or agency to pay pre-
miums direct to insurance fund. 
35-2-20. Repealed. 
Employers' failure to comply a 
misdemeanor — Penalty — 
False claim by employee a mis-
demeanor — Disposition of 
funds collected. 
Noncomplymg employer — To 
pay compensation — Failure to 
pay. 
Docketing of award creates lien — 
Execution. 
Judgments for nonpayment of 
premiums — Preference. 
Waiting period after disability — 
Exception as to disbursements 
and expenses. 
Occupational diseases — Proxi-
mate causation. 
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